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JUDICIAL NULLIFICATION OF JURIES: USE OF
ACQUITTED CONDUCT AT SENTENCING
EANG NGov*

ABSTRACT

At trial, defendants are afforded a panoply of rights-right to counsel, to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to confront witnesses, and to exclude
inadmissible evidence. However, these rights, except for the right to counsel,
disappear at sentencing. In deciding a defendant's sentence, a court may
consider conduct that has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and even
conduct of which the jury has acquitted the defendant. Consideration of
acquitted conduct has resulted in dramatic increases in the length of
defendants' sentences-sometimes resulting in life imprisonment-based merely
on a judge's finding that a defendant more likely than not committed the
offense. Courts have relied on United States v. Watts and United States v.
Booker to support their continued use of acquitted conduct at sentencing. This
Article argues that Watts is not viable and that the merits majority opinion in
Booker, as opposed to the remedial majority opinion, is most consistent with
the Court's precedent established by Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny.
This Article concludes that use of acquitted conduct violates the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. In addition to offering a constitutional basis,
this Article examines the following policy grounds for prohibiting the use of
acquitted conduct: the role served by juries and benefits they provide, the
dramatic impact of sentencing enhancements based on acquitted conduct, the
potential for misuse by prosecutors, and the end of actual or legal innocence.
Finally, this Article suggests that United States v. Gall and United States v.
Kimbrough have restored judicial discretion in sentencing, providing judges
with the independence to reject the use of acquitted conduct on the grounds that
it contravenes the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-to
promote respect for the law, afford deterrence, and avoid unwarranted disparity.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida A&M University College of Law. J.D., University
of California at Berkeley School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, University of Florida.
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INTRODUCTION

Henry Lombard, Jr. endured a week and a half long trial' in the Maine
Superior Court on two counts of murder.2 The jury acquitted him on both
charges.3 However, Lombard's victory was short-lived. Just a year after his4
acquittal on the state murder charges, Lombard faced another judge and jury.
This time, a federal jury convicted him of illegal possession of a firearm. 5
Because the firearm was the alleged murder weapon in the earlier state case, 6
the federal judge was able to consider the murders for which Lombard was
acquitted in determining his sentence for the firearm possession. Despite the
acquittal, the federal judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Lombard committed the two murders. 7 .Although he was not accused of the
murders in federal court, 8 and the federal government could never prosecute
Lombard for the murders, 9 the murders formed the basis for his life sentence.' 0
In federal court and many state courts,11 once a defendant is convicted,
1. Telephone interview with Ronald W. Bourget, Counsel for Henry Lombard, Jr.,
Bourget & Bourget, P.A. (Jul. 1, 2008).
2. United States v. Lombard (Lombard I), 72 F.3d 170, 172 (1st Cir. 1995). For
additional discussion of Lombard's case, see infra Part IV.A-B.
3. LombardI, 72 F.3d at 172.
4. Id. at 173.
5. Id. at 172.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id.at 179.
9. The federal government could not prosecute Lombard for the murders because it
lacked the jurisdiction to do so. Id. at 178 n. 11 (discussing "the imposition of a life sentence
'enhancement' based on a federally unprosecutable murder").
10. Id.While in prison, Lombard committed suicide. Interview with Ronald W. Bourget,
supra note 1.
11. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45
STAN.L. REv. 523,528 (1993) ("Nearly every state allows sentencing courts to engage freely in
real-offense sentencing as a matter of discretion."); see also State v. Shuler, 780 P.2d 1067,
1069 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a defendant's criminal history and prior criminal
conduct, even if an arrest did not result in a conviction, may be considered at sentencing);
People v. Towne, 186 P.3d 10, 13 (Cal. 2008) ("We conclude that because facts considered by
the court in selecting the appropriate sentence within the available sentencing range need not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a trial court, in this setting, is not prohibited from
considering evidence underlying charges of which a defendant has been acquitted."); State v.
Huey, 505 A.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Conn. 1986) (concluding that courts may consider uncharged,
dismissed, and acquitted conduct at sentencing); People v. Lowery, 642 P.2d 515, 518 (Colo.
1982) (en banc) (finding that "[w]ithin the court's broad discretion to sentence one convicted of
a crime, it is proper for the judge to consider aggravating or mitigating information, including
other charges dismissed at the time of the plea, in order to best balance the competing
sentencing goals ofpunishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society"); People v.
Deleon, 882 N.E.2d 999, 1009 (I11.
2008) ("It is well established that 'evidence of criminal
conduct can be considered at sentencing even if the defendant previously had been acquitted of
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under the concept of relevant conduct, the defendant's sentence can be
increased by the consideration of uncharged, dismissed, or even acquitted
conduct of the defendant,12 like in Lombard's case. Relevant conduct allows a
that conduct."') (quoting People v. Jackson, 599 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ill. 1992)); People v.
Thomas, 561 N.E.2d 57, 77 (Ill. 1990) (finding prior criminal conduct, even if it has not been
adjudicated, admissible at sentencing as long as "it is relevant, reliable and subject to crossexamination"); Flinn v. State, 563 N.E.2d 536, 544 (Ind. 1990) ("A sentencing court, however,
is not limited to considering only convictions in assessing a defendant's criminal history;
pending charges and uncharged crimes may be considered."); Smith v. State, 517 A.2d 1081,
1087 (Md. 1986) (providing cases from thirty-six states that permit consideration of uncharged
or unconvicted conduct at sentencing); People v. Ewing, 458 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1990)
(permitting consideration of uncharged conduct and pending charges at sentencing "where those
facts have been developed through sworn testimony"); People v. Brownell, No. 279543, 2008
WL 2514186, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Jun. 24, 2008) ("Although the jury acquitted defendant of
an additional count of digital penetration, a sentencing court may consider facts concerning
uncharged offenses, pending charges, and even acquittals, provided that the defendant is
afforded an opportunity to challenge the information and, if it is challenged, it is substantiated
by a preponderance of the evidence.") (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Walker, 167
P.3d 879, 882 (Mont. 2007) ("We have held that the sentencing court may consider 'other acts,
even those resulting in acquittal or which are dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain agreement."'
(quoting State v. Mason, 82 P.3d 903, 908 (Mont. 2003))); State v. Jenkins, No. 97-05-0467,
2008 WL 2434869, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jun. 13, 2008) (affirming the trial court's
enhanced sentence based on its finding at sentencing that the defendant committed manslaughter
using a gun, despite the jury's acquittal of gun charges); People v. Yung, 557 N.Y.S.2d 978,
980 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (permitting consideration of thirty uncharged burglaries at
sentencing); State v. Jones, No. 06MA109, 2008 WL 852071, at *14 (Ohio App. 7 Dist. Mar.
17, 2008) ("[A] sentencing court may consider the existence of other prior charges and arrests
even if the defendant has been acquitted on those charges or those charges have been dismissed
prior to trial."); State v. Epley, Nos. 97APA1 1-1467, 97APAI 1-1468, 1998 WL 542694, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1998) (finding that the trial court's consideration of acquitted conduct
at sentencing was permissible under United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997)); State v.
Winfield, 23 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tenn. 2000) ("[A] sentencing court may apply an enhancement
factor based on facts underlying an offense for which the defendant has been acquitted, so long
as the facts have been established in the record by a preponderance of the evidence."); Elias v.
State, 286 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Wis. 1980) (holding that a sentencing court may consider
uncharged and nonconviction offenses at sentencing "since those other offenses are evidence of
a pattern of behavior"); State v. Aguilar, No. 2007AP 114, 2007 WL 4245638, at *3 (Wis. Ct.
App. Dec. 5, 2007) ("The sentencing court may consider conduct for which the defendant has
been acquitted."). But cf. State v. Burgess, 943 A.2d 727, 731 (N.H. 2008) ("[J]udges in
sentencing should not rely upon allegations of other crimes by the defendant when such
allegations are unsubstantiated, resolved by acquittals, or the product of speculation."); Michael
Tonry, Salvaging the Sentencing Guidelines in Seven Easy Steps, 10 FED. SENT'G REP. 51, 53
(1997) (pointing out that Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington permit sentences
to be based only on convicted offenses); David Yellen, Reforming the FederalSentencing
Guidelines'MisguidedApproachto Real-Offense Sentencing, 58-STAN. L. REv. 267, 271 (2005)
(concluding that state sentencing schemes "are largely charge-based and make only modest use
of real-offense sentencing").
12. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.3 to -.4 (2004).
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sentencing court to reach as far back in time as can be said to be part of
13 the
scheme, plan, or enterprise related to the defendant's convicted offense.
In addition to the type of conduct permitted for consideration, the
defendant's sentence is affected by the standard ofproof applied at sentencing.
The government need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the uncharged, dismissed, or acquitted acts. 14 Thus, the
13. Id.
14. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,477 U.S. 79,91(1986), the Supreme Court held that, at
sentencing, a preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due process. In 1991, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission amended its commentary and endorsed the preponderance of the
evidence standard, stating, "The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in
resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of a case." U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (2004).
Only when the sentence enhancement becomes the "tail which wags the dog of the
substantive offense" (i.e., the enhancement for the nonconviction offenses outweighs the
maximum exposure the defendant would have received based solely on the convicted offense)
will some courts require a higher standard of proof. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88. The Tenth
Circuit, for example, has recognized that a more stringent standard of proof may be necessary in
such circumstances. See United States v. Zuni, 506 F. Supp. 2d 663,667 (D.N.M. 2007), aff'd,
273 F. App'x 733 (10th Cir. 2008). In some cases, the Eighth Circuit has implicitly left open the
possibility of a higher standard of proof See United States v. Okai, 454 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir.
2006), cert. denied,549 U.S. 1065 (2006) ("[W]e have recognized that due process may require
sentencing courts to apply a higher standard of proof in situations where the sentencing
enhancement becomes the 'tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."' (quoting
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88)). But see United States v. Johnson, 450 F.3d 831, 833 (8th Cir. 2006)
("[The defendant] requests that we at least adopt a clear and convincing standard in cases in
which enhancements have a 'disproportionate impact on the sentence.' It is clearly established
in this circuit that sentencing enhancements must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence,
however."); United States v. Garcia-Gonon, 433 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Under an
advisory Guidelines regime, sentencing judges are only required to find sentence-enhancing
facts by a preponderance of the evidence.") However, the Eighth Circuit in at least one instance
has taken the approach that a court may not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt unless
there is a disproportionate impact between the offense of enhancement and offense of
conviction. See Okai, 454 F.3d at 852. The Ninth Circuit has required "clear and convincing"
evidence in some cases. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Ninth Circuit has identified six factors in determining if a clear and convincing standard is
warranted:
(1) whether "the enhanced sentence fall[s] within the maximum sentence for the crime
alleged in the indictment;" (2) whether "the enhanced sentence negate[s] the presumption
of innocence or the prosecution's burden of proof for the crime alleged in the indictment;"
(3) whether "the facts offered in support of the enhancement create new offenses requiring
separate punishment;" (4) whether "the increase in sentence [is] based on the extent of a
conspiracy;" (5) whether "the increase in the number of offense levels [is] less than or
equal to four;" and (6) whether "the length of the enhanced sentence more than double[s]
the length of the sentence authorized by the initial sentencing guideline range in a case
where the defendant would otherwise have received a relatively short sentence."
Id. at 928 (quoting United States v. Valensia, 222 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2000)). These are
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 238 2008-2009
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defendant's sentence for a single convicted offense can be increased at
sentencing by a judge's determination that the defendant more likely than not
committed additional criminal conduct, despite a jury's previous acquittal of
that conduct. Not only is the government excused from the rigors of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, but the government is also excused from the rules
of evidence customarily attendant at trial.' 5 Hearsay, double hearsay, and even17
16
triple hearsay is permissible as long as there is an "indicia of reliability."'
Finally, although the additional facts found at sentencing can dramatically
increase a defendant's sentence, the right to confront witnesses, one of the basic
rights at trial, is not recognized at sentencing.' 8
examples of some approaches used by the circuits, but an extensive discussion is beyond the
scope of this Article.
15. FED. R. EviD. I 101(d)(3). See generally Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The
FederalRules of Evidence After Sixteen Years: The Effect of "PlainMeaning" Jurisprudence,
the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestionsfor Selective
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857, 885-91 (1992) (proposing amendment ofthe
Rules of Evidence to provide additional protection at sentencing); Margaret A. Berger,
Rethinking the Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at Sentencing: Of Relevant Conduct and
Hearsayand the Needfor an Infield Fly Rule, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 96 (1992) (arguing for the
need to have evidentiary rules that prohibit prosecutors from introducing evidence at sentencing
regarding uncharged conduct and acquitted conduct); Deborah Young, Untested Evidence: A
Weak Foundation For Sentencing, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 63 (1992) (discussing measures to
improve evidentiary foundation at sentencing).
16. The Eighth Circuit stated, "Uncorroborated hearsay evidence and unprosecuted
criminal activity are both proper topics for the court's consideration, as long as the defendant is
afforded an opportunity to explain or rebut the evidence." United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885,
893 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also United States v. Evans, 891 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir.
1989) ("Uncorroborated hearsay evidence contained in a presentence report may be considered
by the sentencer provided the persons sentenced are given an opportunity to explain or rebut the
evidence."). Courts have justified the use of hearsay evidence based on the belief that "due
process does not mandate an evidentiary hearing to establish the accuracy of... information
contained in a presentence report before it can be considered by a trial court." York, 830 F.2d at
893 (citing United States v. Papajohn, 701 F.2d 760, 763 (8th Cir. 1983)).
17. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (2004) ("In resolving any
reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may
consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence
applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy.")
18. The lack of confrontation rights at sentencing has its roots in Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241 (1949). In Williams, the Supreme Court upheld a death sentence that was imposed
based on information received from the probation department, which relied on a witness whom
the defendant did not have an opportunity to examine and confront. Id. at 242, 252. The jury
had recommended life imprisonment, but the sentencing court imposed death because of
additional information from the probation department relating to thirty other burglaries
committed by the defendant within the vicinity of the murder and the defendant's "morbid
sexuality." Id. at 242, 244.
In affirming the sentence, the Supreme Court explained the distinction between trial
and sentencing:
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 239 2008-2009
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Whether use of acquitted conduct at sentencing should continue requires an
examination of constitutional law and policy. Although consideration of
acquitted conduct at sentencing is common in federal and state courts, the
United States Supreme Court has rarely addressed its constitutionality. In
UnitedStates v. Watts,' 9 the Court, without full briefing or oral argument, held
that consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing is "consistent with the
Double Jeopardy Clause ' 20 because it "does not result in 'punishment' for any
offense other than the one of which the defendant was convicted.",21 Later, in
UnitedStates v. Booker,22 the Court considered whether the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines") violated the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial by
In a trial before verdict the issue is whether a defendant is guilty of having engaged in
certain criminal conduct of which he has been specifically accused. Rules of evidence have
been fashioned for criminal trials which narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence that
is strictly relevant to the particular offense charged. These rules rest in part on a necessity
to prevent a time consuming and confusing trial of collateral issues. They were also
designed to prevent tribunals concerned solely with the issue of guilt of a particular offense
from being influenced to convict for that offense by evidence that the defendant had
habitually engaged in other misconduct. A sentencing judge, however, is not confined to
the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to
determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined.
Highly relevant-if not essential-to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession
of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics. And
modem concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a
sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a
requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the
trial.
Id. at 246-47.
For additional discussion about confrontation rights at sentencing and the Court's
jurisprudence after Williams, see John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment
Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLuM. L. REv. 1967 (2005) (critiquing the distinction
between trial rights and sentencing rights and arguing "for a unified theory of Sixth Amendment
rights" in capital cases and sentencing), and Christopher K. Tahbaz, Note, Fairnessto the End:
The Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1345, 1346 (1989) (arguing for an extension of confrontation rights to capital sentencing
proceedings). See generally Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines
Sentencing: The ConstitutionalSignificance of the "Elements of the Sentence," 35 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 147 (1993) (arguing that defendants should have confrontation rights when the
government presents witnesses against the defendant at sentencing); Alan Dubois & Anne E.
Blanchard, SentencingDue Process:How Courts Can Use TheirDiscretion to Make Sentencing
More Accurate and Trustworthy, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 84 (2005) (arguing that confrontation and
cross examination rights would make sentencing more accurate); Michael S. Pardo,
ConfrontationClause ImplicationsofConstitutionalSentencing Options, 18 FED. SENT'G REP.
230 (2006) (arguing for the right of confrontation at sentencing in some circumstances).
19. 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam).
20. Id. at 154-55.
21. Id
22. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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allowing judges to find facts at sentencing that were not admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.23 The Court provided
two majority opinions. The merits majority held that the Guidelines infringed
on a defendant's Sixth Amendment right,24 but rather than engrafting the Sixth
Amendment onto the Guidelines, the remedial majority rendered the Guidelines
advisory by excising the mandatory language. 25 This Article examines whether
use of acquitted conduct is constitutionally permissible under the advisory
Guidelines.2 6
Although all federal circuits permit use of acquitted conduct, their reliance
on Booker to support consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing is an
exercise of selective interpretation that ignores the substance of the merits
majority. 27 The merits majority in Booker recognized the traditional role of
juries in guarding against judicial despotism 28 and reaffirmed Apprendi v. New
Jersey.29 This Article argues that use of acquitted conduct to enhance sentences,
even under the advisory Guidelines, violates the Sixth Amendment because
judges are permitted to find facts that enhance a defendant's sentence beyond
that authorized by the jury's verdict and that Watts is not viable in light of the
merits majority in Booker, which is consistent with precedence.
From a policy perspective, the role of the jury, impact of acquitted conduct
on defendants' sentences, potential for misuse by prosecutors, and the meaning
of an acquittal as it relates to legal or actual innocence are important
considerations. Allowing a judge to determine by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant committed a crime of which the jury acquitted raises
the question of who should be the fact finder. Juries provide several benefits:
23. Id. at 245.
24. Id. at 244.
25. Id. at 259.
26. Although Booker and its precursors have attracted much attention from scholars, there
has been relatively little written about the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing after Booker.
Only a few works have examined the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing after Booker. See
Steven G. Kalar & Jon M. Sands, An ObjectAll Sublime-Let the PunishmentFit the Crime, 32
CHAMP. 20, 27 (2008) (reviewing Gall and Kimbrough and predicting that acquitted conduct is
"the next major front in the sentencing battle"); James J. Bilsborrow, Note, Sentencing
Acquitted Conduct to the Post-Booker Dustbin,49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 289 (2007) (arguing
that use of acquitted conduct is unconstitutional); Franaz Farkish, Note, Docking the Tail that
Wags the Dog: Why Congress Should Abolish Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing and How
Courts Should Treat Acquitted Conduct After United States v. Booker, 20 REGENT U. L. REv.
101, 123 (2007) (proposing that Congress amend 18 U.S.C. § 3661, the statute prohibiting
limitation of information that judges receive, to restrict consideration of acquitted conduct).
27. See infra notes 142-50.
28. Booker, 543 U.S. at 238-39.
29. Id. at 244. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the Court held:
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."
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they serve as a check on the government, the judiciary, and the law, and they
reinforce democratic norms. The diversity, group dynamics, and neutrality of
juries offer benefits in fact-finding over that of a single judge. Consideration of
acquitted conduct by a judge after a jury has already deliberated sends a
message that the work of the jury was unnecessary and, in turn, threatens to
undermine the role the jury serves and advantages it provides over judicial factfinding.
Additionally, consideration of acquitted conduct to support an enhanced
sentence for another offense can add years to a defendant's sentence 30 and in
some cases even result in life imprisonment. 3 1 Allowing a judge to find that a
defendant committed the acquitted conduct through a preponderance of the
evidence provides prosecutors with the opportunity to take a "second bite" after
they have previously failed at trial to prove that the defendant committed the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.32 Coupled with the absence of the rules of
evidence and procedural safeguards at sentencing, such as the right to confront
witnesses, the power differential is further shifted in the direction of the
prosecution.33
Another question raised by the use of acquitted conduct is what is the
significance of an acquittal? Watts found that without specific jury findings, an
acquittal does not prove that a defendant is innocent but merely that the
government did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.34 At the very
least, an acquittal should mean that the defendant is legally innocent-that no
legal repercussions should result. Otherwise, other than protecting the
defendant from the stigma of an additional conviction, acquittals are relatively
meaningless because a defendant can be sentenced to the same length of
imprisonment that would have been imposed had he actually been convicted of
the offense.3 5
A final consideration is whether use of acquitted conduct promotes the
purposes of sentencing specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This statute instructs
courts to consider whether their sentencing decision will promote respect for
the law, afford deterrence, and avoid unwarranted disparity. Anecdotes suggest
that the general public and even lawyers are unaware that an acquittal can be
30. See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 392 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (The district court's
consideration of acquitted conduct enhanced the sentence from a range of I to 11/2 years to the
maximum of 20 years; upon remand, the sentence was reduced to 12 years.).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Lombard (Lombard I), 72 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1995)
(enhancing sentence from an original range of 262 to 327 months to life imprisonment after
consideration of acquitted conduct).
32. Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don't Succeed-Abolishing the Use of Acquitted
Conduct in Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153, 182-83 (1996).
33. See Beale, supra note 18, at 151.
34. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (per curiam).
35. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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used at sentencing, which negatively affects the public's respect for the law and
deterrence.36 The legislative history shows that the intent was to avoid
unwarranted disparity between those who have been convicted of an offense,
rather than those acquitted of an offense.37 Sentence enhancements often
expose a defendant who was acquitted of a crime to the same sentence received
by another defendant who was actually convicted of that very crime. This
practice creates unwarranted similarities, rather than avoids unwarranted38
disparities in sentencing. This Article, therefore, proposes that federal courts 39
should use the judicial discretion afforded by Booker, Gall v. United States,
and Kimbrough v. UnitedStates4° to evaluate the purposes of sentencing and
should reject the use of acquitted conduct.41
36. See Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretionof Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1714 (1992).
37. See generally Michael M. O'Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity:Implementing 18
US.C. § 3553(a)(6) After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 635-39 (2006) (discussing the
legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)).
38. Because most states permit judicial discretion to consider real offense characteristics,
the purposes of sentencing stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) would be worth considering in state
sentencing matters and the suggestions proposed in this Article would be applicable in state
sentencing schemes as well.
39. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
40. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
41. There is little scholarship analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) purposes of sentencing as
they relate to acquitted conduct. See Farkish, supra note 26, at 123 (discussing acquitted
conduct generally but making only cursory reference to two 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors).
For works generally about 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing purposes, but unrelated to
acquitted conduct, see William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give
Meaning to § 3553 After Booker andIts Progeny,40 CONN. L. REV. 631 (2008) (arguing that
prioritizing the purposes of sentencing would better guide judges and proposing an approach
similar to that of the United Kingdom); Kenneth R. Feinberg, The FederalGuidelines and the
UnderlyingPurposesof Sentencing, 10 FED. SENT'G REP. 39 (1997) (providing statutory history
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)); Thomas W. Hillier II, Linking JudicialSentences to Congressional
Purposes, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 24 (1995) (proposing that judges identify purpose of sentencing
for each case); Leonard J. Long, Miller'sAlgebra ofPurposesat Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
483, 486-87 (1992) (commenting on Marc Miller's article); Marc Miller, Purposes at
Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 424 (1992) [hereinafter Miller, Purposes at Sentencing]
(exploring congressional intent of the purposes behind sentencing, discussing how judges have
used the purposes at sentencing, and arguing that judges should consider purposes at sentencing
in each case); Michael Edmund O'Neill & Linda Drazga Maxfield, JudicialPerspectiveson the
FederalSentencing Guidelines and The Goals ofSentencing: Debunking the Myths, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 85 (2004) (providing judicial assessment of achieving sentencing goals); Regina StoneHarris, How to Vary from the FederalSentencing Guidelines Without Being Reversed, 19 FED.
SENT'G REP. 183 (2007) (providing pre-Gall and Kimbrough discussion of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)); Symposium, Accomplishing the PurposesofSentencing-The Role of the Courtsand
the Commission, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 179 (2003) (discussing method for determining purposes
of sentencing and who should make that determination); Lee D. Heckman, Note, The Benefits of
DepartureObsolescence:Achieving the Purposesof Sentencing in the Post-Booker World, 69
Oino ST. L.J. 149, 152-54 (2008) (proposing that Congress declare departures obsolete and
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This Article consists of five parts. Part I provides a brief history of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and sentencing case law relating to "relevant
conduct." Part II explores the viability of Watts in light of Booker, the
motivation of the merits majority in Booker, and the justifications offered by
the Booker remedial majority against engrafting the Sixth Amendment into the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Part III illustrates instances when courts have
disregarded the jury's verdict and suggests that the jury's acquittal be respected
because of the valuable role served by juries and the benefits of jury factfinding. Part IV provides additional policy reasons against consideration of
acquitted conduct at sentencing. Finally, Part V examines how consideration of
acquitted conduct affects the purposes of sentencing: promoting respect for the
law, effecting deterrence, protecting the public, and avoiding unwarranted
disparities and unwarranted similarities. This Article suggests that through
consideration of the purposes of sentencing, judges can use their newfound
discretion to respect the jury's verdict and restore legal significance to
acquittals.
I. BACKGROUND

This section provides background information regarding the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and cases relevant to .acquitted conduct, judicial
determination of sentencing facts, and the appellate standard of review for
sentencing decisions made by federal district courts. For those familiar with the
history and developing case law, the argument begins at section II.
A. A BriefHistory of the Sentencing Guidelines andRelevant Conduct
Before the Guidelines,
indeermi
ncin atesent
in42the sentencing regime consisted of parole and•
indeterminate sentencing in which judges had discretion to sentence. At this
time, the rehabilitative model garnered support for indeterminate sentencing,
but around the mid-i 970s criticism of this form of sentencing grew. 43 Critics
decried the unwarranted disparity, which they perceived to be the result of
unfettered judicial discretion."
One of the most influential critics, Judge Marvin E. Frankel, proposed
sentencing reforms that called for an administrative agency to make sentencing
suggesting a preference for variance).
For an extensive and timely source about sentencing matters, see Professor Douglas
Berman's Sentencing Law and Policy Blog at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_
law and_policy.
42. For a detailed history of the Guidelines, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
363-66 (1988); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politicsof SentencingReform: The Legislative
History of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
43. Stith & Koh, supra note 42, at 227-28.
44. Id. at 227.
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rules that would bind courts.45 In response, Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984.46 The Act created the United States Sentencing
Commission ("Commission") and charged it with promulgating guidelines for
sentencing.47 Congress instructed the Commission to "provide certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants ' with
similar records who have been
48
found guilty of similar criminal conduct.
The end product of the Commission's work was the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines 49 -a complex system that would become an endless focus of
scholars and the bane of some sentencing judges. 50 In creating the Guidelines,
45. Id. at 228.
46. Id.at 224-25 (chronicling the Sentencing Reform Act).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)-(b)(1)(A) (2003).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2003). Congress set forth that the Commission's purposes
are to:
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system
that(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2)
of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating
factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices;
and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge ofhuman behavior as
it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and
correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.
Id.Congress specified other duties of the Commission in 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006).
49. The Commission promulgated the Guidelines in 1987, but the Guidelines were not
fully implemented until the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Commission in
Mistrettav. UnitedStates, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
The Guidelines establish ranges of sentences for various offenses and defendants,
which are represented on a grid. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2007). To decide
where a particular defendant falls within the grid, judges must calculate the offense level, which
appears on one axis of the grid, and the offender's criminal history, appearing on another axis.
Id.The intersection of the offense level and the criminal history category is the sentencing
range. Id. The complex grid includes forty-three offense levels and six criminal history
categories, creating 258 guideline ranges. Id.
50. Judges have felt constrained by the Guidelines. See United States v. O'Meara, 895
F.2d 1216, 1221-23 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., dissenting in part) (observing "the sometimes
bizarre and topsy-turvy world of sentencing under the Guidelines" and that judges "have lost
something in this substitution of technical proficiency for the thoughtful exercise of discretion
by the federal judiciary"); Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Emperor's New Clothes: Due Process
Considerations Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 60 TENN. L. REv. 467, 493-94
(1993) (discussing Judge Greene's view that the Guidelines restriction on a judge's use of
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the Commission was faced with a policy decision as to whether to adopt a
charge offense system or real offense system of sentencing. 5'
A pure charge offense system imposes sentences based on the offenses for
which a conviction was obtained.5 2 Because a defendant's sentence would be
limited to the convicted offense, those who oppose a charge offense system
believe that it would not reflect the gravity of the defendant's conduct and the
breadth of his or her culpability. 53 On the other hand, real offense sentencing
imposes punishment for all the circumstances underlying the defendant's
offense, regardless of whether the additional conduct amounted to convictions
or charges. 4 As Justice Breyer-a member of the first Commission-55 -points
out,
The proponents of such a system .

.

. minimize the importance of the

procedures that courts must use to determine the existence of the additional
harms, since the relevant procedural elements are not contained in the typical
criminal statute....
"accumulated experience, judgment, and... wisdom" has disturbed "the due process balance
essential to the fairness of criminal litigation"); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction:
Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1236-37 (2004) [hereinafter Miller,
Domination & Dissatisfaction] ("Judges spoke early and often about their displeasure with the
sentencing rules."); Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching
the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 CoLuM. L. REv. 1124, 1157 n.91 (2005) (noting
specific instances of judicial criticism of the Guidelines); Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's
Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 357, 363-64
(1992) ("[T]here is considerable justification for believing that guideline sentencing will
continue to undermine federal criminal adjudication in more subtle and insidious ways.... We
have fewer occasions on which to share our thoughts and concems about the appropriateness of
our sentences, and their effects on the people whom we are sentencing and the general public.");
Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1,25 (2005) ("Here
is a proposition that few observers of federal sentencing would dispute: the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines constrain sentencing judges more than any other guidelines system does.").
Some members of the judiciary have retired to escape the rigidity and harshness of the
Guidelines. For example, Judge Martin wrote in a New York Times editorial, "When I took my
oath of office 13 years ago I never thought that I would leave the federal bench. While I might
have stayed on despite the inadequate pay, I no longer want to be part of our unjust criminal
justice system." John S. Martin, Jr., Editorial, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2003, at A31 (explaining that congressional changes to sentencing has led to his retirement); see
also Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction, supra note 50, at 1249 ("The New York Times has
reported on a series of orders and sharp comments by judges in federal courts, including, in an
echo of reactions to the early guidelines, judges taking early retirement to avoid sentencing
cases.").
51. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1988).
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id.
54. Id.atO-11.
55. He was a judge on the First Circuit at the time. Id. at 1.
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Of course, the more facts the court must find in this informal way, the
more
unwieldy the process becomes, and the less fair that process appears to
56
be.

In the end, the Commission adopted a modified real offense system that
takes into consideration the defendant's "relevant conduct. ' 57 Under this type
of sentencing scheme, a defendant can be punished for convicted, acquitted, or
uncharged conduct. 58 A judge may take into account not only the defendant's
conduct but also conduct of codefendants that was reasonably foreseeable when
regardless of whether the government
the defendant undertook the actions,
59
charged the codefendants' conduct.
A defendant's relevant conduct can dramatically increase a defendant's
sentence from one guideline range to another by increasing the offense level.6 °

56. Id. at 10.
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1BI.1 to -1.3 (2007). The Guidelines
provide the following instructions to determine the defendant's sentencing range:
(a) Determine, pursuant to § 1B 1.2 (Applicable Guidelines), the offense guideline section
from Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable to the offense of conviction. See § lB 1.2.
(b) Determine the base offense level and apply any appropriate specific offense
characteristics, cross references, and special instructions contained in the particular
guideline in Chapter Two in the order listed. (c) Apply the adjustments as appropriate
related to victim, role, and obstruction ofjustice from Parts A, B, and C of Chapter Three.
(d) If there are multiple counts of conviction, repeat steps (a) through (c) for each count.
Apply Part D of Chapter Three to group the various counts and adjust the offense level
accordingly. (e) Apply the adjustment as appropriate for the defendant's acceptance of
responsibility from Part E of Chapter Three. (f) Determine the defendant's criminal history
category as specified in Part A of Chapter Four. Determine from Part B of Chapter Four
any other applicable adjustments. (g) Determine the guideline range in Part A of Chapter
Five that corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category determined above.
(h) For the particular guideline range, determine from Parts B through G of Chapter Five
the sentencing requirements and options related to probation, imprisonment, supervision
conditions, fines, and restitution. (i) Refer to Parts H and K of Chapter Five, Specific
Offender Characteristics and Departures, and to any other policy statements or commentary
in the guidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence.
Id. § 1B 1.1. For additional detailed explanations regarding the mechanics ofthe Guidelines, see
Federal Criminal Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers, The
American College of TrialLawyers ProposedModifications to the Relevant ConductProvisions
of the UnitedStates Sentencing Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1463 (2001); Stephen Breyer,
supra note 5 1, at 6-7 (providing a step-by-step example of a guideline calculation); Julie R.
O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 1342, 1354-56 (1997).
58. U. S. SENT'G COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES 26 (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/l5_yearstudyfull.pdf.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1322 (6th Cir. 1990) (enhancing
sentence to sixty months based on the judge's finding that there were 1169.5 grams of drugs
despite pro se defendant's plea to being involved with 35.5 grams of drugs, which would have
exposed defendant to fifteen to twenty months in prison).
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However, the determination of facts that underlie relevant conduct can be made
without affording the defendant the rights and procedures normally accorded at
trial. For example, a defendant is not entitled to confront witnesses at
62
sentencing. 61 Furthermore, because the rules of evidence do not apply,
evidence that was once inadmissible at trial is now fair game.6 3 Finally, the
standard of proof diminishes from the highest level at trial (proof beyond a
reasonable doubt) to the lowest level at sentencing (preponderance of the
evidence).64 At sentencing, although a defendant's punishment can be increased
significantly, a judge need only determine the relevant conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence, a standard that is even less than the clear and
convincing standard that is sometimes applied in the civil context. 65 Thus, as
61. See United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The Confrontation
Clause does not apply at sentencing to preclude a court from considering hearsay evidence.");
United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393,401 (8th Cir. 1992) ("We conclude that the enactment of
the Guidelines has not so transformed the sentencing phase that it constitutes a separate criminal
proceeding. The right to confront witnesses, therefore, does not attach."); United States v.
Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The Supreme Court has made clear that the
constitutional requirements mandated in a criminal trial as to confrontation and crossexamination do not apply at non-capital sentencing proceedings."); United States v. Giltner, 889
F.2d 1004, 1008 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("While due process requires that appellant be afforded the
opportunity to refute the information brought against him at sentencing, it does not require that
appellant be given the opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses to rebut the
information."); United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264, 1272 (7th Cir. 1989) ("But by
insisting that a defendant have a 'reasonable opportunity to rebut' contested hearsay, we do not
mean that a judge must hold an elaborate trial-type proceeding before considering hearsay in
sentencing; instead, the judge must simply give the defendant an opportunity to show why the
hearsay information is wrong and to present his side ofthe story."); United States v. Carmona,
873 F.2d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1989) ("It is not a denial of due process for the trial judge, when
determining sentence, to rely on evidence given by witnesses whom the defendant could neither
confront nor cross-examine.").
62. FED. R. EviD. 1101(d)(3).
63. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (2007) ("In resolving any
dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider
relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at
trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy.").
64. See id. § 6A1.3 cmt.; see also United States v. Wong, 2 F.3d 927, 935-36 (9th Cir.
1993) (Norris, J., dissenting) ("The evidence need not persuade the sentencing judge of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, but by a mere preponderance of the evidence-the more-probablethan-not standard used in civil cases.").
65. See Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 & n.18
(1966) (noting that a clear and convincing standard "has been traditionally imposed in cases
involving allegations of civil fraud,. . . adultery, illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock, lost
wills, oral contracts to make bequests, and the like). Although acquitted conduct can
significantly increase a defendant's sentence, and consequently increase a defendant's
deprivation of liberty, a defendant is afforded a lower standard of proof at a criminal sentencing
proceeding than is available at a deportation hearing. In Woodby, the Supreme Court held that a
person may not be deported without a showing of "clear, unequivocal, and convincing
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stated by one court, real offense sentencing can have the "effect

. .

. [of]

permit[ting] the harshest penalty outside of capital punishment to be imposed
not for conduct charged and convicted but for other conduct as to which there
protections, such as
was, at sentencing, at best a shadow of the usual procedural
' 66
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Relevant Cases: United States v. Watts, United States v. Booker, Gall v.
United States, and Kimbrough v. United States
1. UnitedStates v. Watts: Use of Acquitted Conduct and Double Jeopardy
In United States v. Watts,67 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of using acquitted conduct at sentencing as it relates to double
jeopardy concerns. Watts is the only time the Court has considered the use of
acquitted conduct at sentencing. This issue came before the Court through two
cases, United States v. Watts and United States v. Putra, which were
consolidated on appeal.68 In each case, the district court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had committed an act for
which the jury had acquitted and, consequently, imposed an enhanced sentence
based on this acquitted conduct.6 9 The Ninth Circuit vacated both sentences,

evidence." Id. at 285. The Court recognized that a deportation hearing is not a criminal
proceeding, but reasoned that because of the "drastic deprivations" that may result from
deportation, a person should not be "banished from this country upon no higher degree ofproof
than applies in a negligence case." Id.
For general discussions about the preponderance of the evidence standard and
proposals for a higher standard of proof, see David N. Adair, Jr., House Built on a Weak
Foundation--SentencingGuidelines and the PreponderanceStandard,4 FED.SENT'G REP. 292
(1992); Lauren Greenwald, Note, Relevant Conduct And The Impact Of The Preponderance
Standard Of ProofUnder The FederalSentencing Guidelines:A Denial Of Due Process, 18
VT. L. REv. 529 (1994).
66. United States v. Lombard (Lombard I), 72 F.3d 170, 177-78 (1st Cir. .1995).
67. 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 149.
69. In Watts, the defendant was indicted for possession of the cocaine base found in his
kitchen cabinet and two loaded guns and ammunition that were concealed in a bedroom closet.
Id. at 149. At trial, the jury convicted Watts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute but
acquitted him of using a firearm related to a drug offense. Id. at 149-50. The district court,
despite the jury's acquittal on the firearm charge, enhanced the defendant's base level by two
points because the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had
possessed the guns in connection to a drug offense. Id. at 150.
In Putra, the government indicted Putra on one count of aiding and abetting
possession with intent to distribute one ounce of cocaine and a second count involving five
ounces. Id. The jury convicted the defendant of the first count involving one ounce of cocaine
but acquitted the defendant on the second count that alleged five ounces of cocaine. Id
However, the district court at sentencing found that the defendant, by a preponderance of the
evidence, had taken part in conduct alleged in the second count and, consequently, aggregated
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holding that a district court may not consider acquitted conduct at sentencing
regardless of the standard of proof.7 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the jury's
verdict represented an "explicit rejection" ofthe defendant's involvement in the
additional conduct and an enhanced sentence based on this conduct "would be
effectively Runishing [the defendant] for an offense for which she has been
acquitted."
However, the Supreme Court reversed and held that consideration of
acquitted conduct at sentencing does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
when the conduct at issue is proven by a preponderance of the evidence.72 The
Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's view of73double jeopardy and reiterated its
prior conclusions in Witte v. United States:
"[C]onsideration of information about the defendant's character and conduct
at sentencing does not result in 'punishment' for any offense other than the
one of which the defendant was convicted." Rather, the defendant is
"punished only for the fact that the present offense was carried out in a
manner that warrants increased punishment ....
An acquittal, as the Court distinguished, "does not prove that the defendant
is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. '75 The Court opined, "[A]n acquittal is not a finding of any fact. An
acquittal can only be an acknowledgment that the government failed to prove
an essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Without specific
jury findings, no one can logically or realistically draw any factual finding
inferences .... 76 Therefore, the Court concluded that "the jury cannot be said
to have 77'necessarily rejected' any facts when it returns a general verdict of not
guilty.

the amount of drugs from both sales to determine the defendant's base offense level. Id.at
150-51.
70. Id.
71. Id.at 151.
72. Id.at 157.

73.

515 U.S. 389 (1995).

74. Watts, 519 U.S. at 155 (quoting Witte, 515 U.S. at 401, 403) (citation omitted).
75. Id. (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361
(1984)).
76. Id. (quoting United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1996) (Wallace, C.J.,
dissenting)) (alteration in original).
77 Id. at 155. Interestingly, on January 2, 1997, just four days before the Watts decision,
the Commission was considering amendments to the Guidelines regarding the use of acquitted
conduct at sentencing. It published the following proposal:
9. Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This amendment addresses the issue of whether
acquitted conduct may be considered for sentencing purposes. Option I of this amendment
excludes the use of acquitted conduct as a basis for determining the guideline range.
Option I has two suboptions, either or both of which could be added. Option 1(A) adds the
bracketed language, in the guideline and application note, providing that acquitted conduct
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2. UnitedStates v. Booker: The Sixth Amendment and Judicial Fact-Finding
In United States v. Booker,78 the Supreme Court considered whether
application of the Sentencing Guidelines that permitted judges to find facts
violated the Sixth Amendment in the consolidated cases of United States v.
Booker and United States v. Fanfan.79 The Supreme Court provided two
majority opinions in Booker: one discussing the constitutional question and
another providing the remedy. 80 Regarding the merits question, the Court held
shall be considered if established independently of evidence admitted at trial. Option 1(B)
invites the use of acquitted conduct as a basis for upward departure. Option 2 is derived
from a "compromise" proposal suggested several years ago by the Commission's
Practitioners' Advisory Group. It excludes acquitted conduct from consideration in
determining the guideline range unless such conduct is established by the "clear and
convincing" standard, rather than the less exacting "preponderance of the evidence"
standard generally applicable to the determination of relevant conduct. Option3expressly
provides what currently is arguably implicit in the Relevant Conduct guideline: that
acquitted conduct should be evaluated using the same standards as any other form of
unconvicted conduct and included in determining the guideline range if those standards are
met. However, the amended commentary invites a discretionary downward departure to
exclude such conduct if the use of that conduct to enhance the sentence raises substantial
concerns of fundamental fairness. It also states what should be the obvious appropriate
floor for such a downward departure.ProposedAmendment:[Option IA: Section 1B1.3 is
amended by inserting the following new subsection: "(c) Acquitted conduct, i.e., conduct
necessarily rejected by the trier of fact in finding the defendant not guilty of a charge, shall
not be considered relevant conduct under this section unless it is independently established
by evidence not admitted at trial."
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 62 Fed. Reg. 152, 161 (Jan. 2, 1997).
78. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
79. Id. The defendant Booker was convicted by a jury for possession with the intent to
distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine after the jury heard evidence that the defendant had
possessed 92.5 grams of drugs. Id. at 227. The defendant's base sentencing range, after
considering his criminal history, would have been 210 to 262 months imprisonment. Id.
However, during the sentencing hearing, the district court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and obstructed
justice. Id. The inclusion of these additional facts increased the defendant's sentence to a new
sentencing range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Id.
In Fanfan's case, the jury found him guilty of conspiracy to distribute and to possess
with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine. Id. at 228. The maximum sentence
resulting from the jury's verdict would have been 78 months. Id. Later, at the sentencing
hearing, the district court attributed to the defendant 2.5 kilograms of cocaine powder and 261.6
grams of crack. Id. The court also found that the defendant had a leadership role in the drug
activity. Id. As a result of the additional findings, the new sentencing range for the defendant
was 188 to 235 months imprisonment. Id.
80. In this rare opinion, the remedial majority is comprised of the Justices who dissented
in the merits opinion, except for Justice Ginsburg, who was the swing vote. Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg formed the merits majority; Justices Breyer, Rehnquist,
O'Conner, Kennedy, and Ginsburg formed the remedial majority.
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that the Sixth Amendment applies to the Guidelines and that "[a]ny fact (other
than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt."'8 For the remedy, rather than engrafting the Sixth
Amendment right onto the Guidelines, the Court severed and excised two
provisions of the statute and cross-references to those provisions, thereby
making the Guidelines advisory.82
a. The Merits Majority
The Court's merits holding rested on its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
83
84
developed through
85 Apprendi v. New Jersey, Ring v. Arizona, and Blakely v.
Washington. In Apprendi, the district court issued an enhanced sentence
based on finding at sentencing that the defendant acted with racial animus.8 6
The Supreme Court set aside the enhanced sentence, holding that "[o]ther than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."87 The fact that the state of New Jersey
characterized the hate crime as an enhancement did not obviate these
protections.8 8
Later, in Ring, the Court made clear that the characterization of a critical
fact, as either an element or a sentencing factor, was irrelevant. 89 Arizona law
had permitted judges to determine the existence of aggravating factors to
impose the death penalty following a jury's determination of guilt in a first
degree murder trial. 90 In deciding whether Arizona's practice of allowing
81.
82.

Id. at 244.
Id. at 245.

83.
84.
85.

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
542 U.S. 296 (2004).

86. The defendant pled guilty to charges of possession of an unlawful firearm and
unlawful possession of a bomb. Apprendi,530 U.S. at 469-70. At sentencing, the court found
that the defendant had acted with racial bias and enhanced the defendant's sentence pursuant to
a hate crime statute. Id. at 471. However, the charges neither alleged that the defendant acted
with racial animus nor referred to the hate crime statute. Id. at 469. The defendant would have
faced a maximum of 20 years imprisonment for the pled charges but faced a maximum of 30
years due to the enhancement. Id. at 470.
87. Id. at 490.
88. Id. at 492.
89. Ring, 536 U.S. at 584.
90. Id. at 588. At sentencing, the judge sitting alone, found two aggravating factors--that
the defendant committed the crime for pecuniary gain and "in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner"--and sentenced the defendant to death. Id. at 594-95. However, based solely
on the jury's determination of guilt, the statutory maximum punishment was life imprisonment.
Id. at 592, 597. Only through the sentencing judge's additional findings of fact was the
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judges to find aggravating factors violated the Sixth Amendment's right to trial
by jury, the Court pointed out that "[t]he dispositive question... 'is one not of
form, but of effect.' If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the
State labels it-must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 91
In Blakely, the Court addressed the question of when does a sentence
exceed the statutory maximum punishment to trigger the Sixth Amendment
requirement of a jury's determination of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as
the Court recognized in Apprendi.92 The defendant pled guilty to kidnapping,
which carried a maximum sentence of 53 months. 93 However, Washington state
law permitted a judge to impose an "exceptional" sentence if a court
determined that the defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty." 94 The sentencing
court found that the defendant had indeed acted with deliberate cruelty and
sentenced him to 90 months. 95
In considering the question presented in Blakely, the Court invoked the
principles underlying the right to jury trial articulated in Apprendi and found
that the Washington statute violated the Sixth Amendment.9 6 The Court
explained:
[The] commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects not just respect for
longstanding precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to the right of
jury trial. That right is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental
reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures
the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury
trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary. Apprendi carries out this
design by ensuring that the judge's authority to sentence derives wholly from
the jury's verdict. Without that restriction,
the jury would not exercise the
97
control that the Framers intended.
In Booker, the Court compared the sentencing scheme in Blakely with the
federal Guidelines and found that there was no distinction between the
Washington sentencing procedure that was invalidated in Blakely and the
Guidelines in question.98 Both were mandatory. 99 Judges were bound to the
requirements of the Guidelines because 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) instructed that
courts "shall impose a sentence ofthe kind, and within the range."' 00 Thus, the
defendant at risk for the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 596.
91. Id. at 602 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494) (citation omitted).
92. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004).
93. Id. at 298-99.
94. Id.
95. Id.
at 298.
96. Id. at 305.
97. Id. at 305-06 (citation omitted).
98. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233-34 (2005).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 234 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006)) (emphasis added).
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Sixth Amendment concerns applied equally to both the Guidelines and the
Washington scheme.
Applying the Sixth Amendment, the Booker Court found that the federal
Guidelines violated the right to have a jury determine facts beyond a reasonable
doubt.' 0 ' It reaffirmed Apprendi and explained the following:
More important than the language used in our holding in Apprendi are the
principles we sought to vindicate. Those principles are unquestionably
applicable to the Guidelines. They are not the product of recent innovations
in our jurisprudence, but rather have their genesis in the ideals our
constitutional tradition assimilated from the common law. The Framers of the
Constitution understood the threat of "judicial despotism" that could arise
from "arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions" without the benefit
of a jury in criminal cases. The Founders presumably carried this concern
from England, 02in which the right to a jury trial had been enshrined since the
Magna Carta.1

b. The Remedial Majority
Because the mandatory language in the Guidelines would render them
unconstitutional, the remedial majority fashioned a remedy by excising the
mandatory language from the Guidelines. 103 First, the Court excised 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1), which required courts to impose sentences within the range
mandated by the Guidelines.'04 Although excision of the mandatory language
created advisory Guidelines, courts must still consider the Guidelines during
sentencing. 105 Judges must also consider the purposes of sentencing articulated
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-that the sentence must be as follows:
sufficient, but not greater than necessary...
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational trainin§g
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
Second, the Court excised § 3742(e), the provision requiring de novo

101. Id. at 243-44.
102. Id. at 238-39 (quoting TuE

FEDERALIST

No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton)

(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) (citations omitted).
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 245.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 259-60.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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review of departures from the Guidelines, because it depended on the
Guidelines being mandatory.10 7 The Court then specified that sentences on
appeal would be reviewed for "unreasonableness" as they relate to § 3553(a).'1 8
It explained that "[s]ection 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth numerous
factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts,
as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable."' 0 9
However, this brief explanation left many unanswered questions. Later, through
Gall v. United States" ' and Kimbroughv. UnitedStates,I ' the Court began to
provide additional guidance regarding the balance of judicial discretion and
"reasonableness" review.
3. Gall v. United States: Presumption of Unreasonableness
The "reasonableness" standard for appellate review established in Booker
has led to questions about how appellate courts should apply this standard-in
other words, when is a district court's sentencing decision reasonable? In Gall
v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a
sentence below the recommended Guidelines could be construed by appellate
courts as presumptively unreasonable." 2 Because of Gall's law-abiding conduct
in having withdrawn from the conspiracy, his continued abstinence from drug
usage since 2002, and his initiative to start a business, the district court found
that the recommended guideline range was greater than necessary to meet the
purposes of sentencing as stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." 3 The district court
107. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
108. Id. at 261.
109. Id.
110. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
111. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
112. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). This case arose from the
defendant's drug activities in college. During his second year of college, the defendant used and
distributed ecstasy. Id. at 591-92. A couple of months after joining the ecstasy-selling
enterprise, the defendant stopped his ecstasy use, and after seven months' involvement in
ecstasy distribution, the defendant withdrew from the conspiracy. Id. at 592. Some time later,
after graduating in 2002, the defendant moved to Arizona to work in the construction industry.
Id.
While in Arizona, the defendant was questioned by federal agents about the ecstasy
distribution, to which the defendant admitted his involvement. Id.A year and a half after his
initial contact with the federal agents and three and a half years after the defendant's withdrawal
from the drug conspiracy, the government charged him and other codefendants with conspiracy
to distribute cocaine, ecstasy, and marijuana. Id. During the time that had lapsed between the
interview with federal law enforcement and his indictment, the defendant had moved to
Colorado and became a master carpenter. Id. After the indictment, the defendant surrendered
himself to the authorities, and while released on his own recognizance, he began a construction
business. Id.
113. Id. at 593.
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sentenced him to 36 months ofprobation,as opposed to the
4 30 to 37 months of
report"
presentence
the
by
recommended
imprisonment
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that a sentence falling outside of the
Guideline range must "be supported by a justification that 'is proportional to
the extent of the difference between the advisory range and the sentence
imposed.""' 5 Because the difference between probation and the bottom range
of 30 months was, in the Eighth Circuit's view, "extraordinary," the Eighth
Circuit required that this "100% downward variance" be justified by
extraordinary circumstances.16 The Eighth Circuit found none existed and
reversed the sentence." 7
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that regardless of
the degree of variance from the Guideline range, appellate review of sentences
must be conducted under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard."'
Applying that standard, the Court held that the sentence imposed by the district
court was reasonable." 19
Additionally, the Court outlined the proper process in reviewing sentences:
[An appellate court] must first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the §3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence-including
an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines
20
range.
Once an appellate court determines that the district court's sentencing
determinations comport with the above procedural considerations, then the
appellate court should review the sentence
for "substantive reasonableness"
12
using an abuse-of-discretion standard.'
Although an appellate court may consider the degree of variance from the
Guidelines range and the extent ofjustification provided by the district court,
the Supreme Court rejected "an appellate rule that requires, 'extraordinary'
circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range.' 22 The Court
further rejected "the use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses the
percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 591.
Id.
Id. at 597.
Id.
Id. at 595.
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justifications required for a specific sentence.' ' 123 Although the Court in Rita v.
UnitedStates124 permitted a presumption of reasonableness for sentences within
Guideline ranges, the Gall Court explained that a presumption of
unreasonableness for sentences outside of the Guideline ranges is
impermissible because it contravenes Booker.125 An appellate court "must give
due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
whole, justify the extent of the variance. The fact that the appellate court might
was appropriate is
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence
126
court.'
district
the
of
reversal
justify
to
insufficient
4. Kimbrough v. UnitedStates: Purposes of Sentencing in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) and the Post-Booker Reasonableness Standard of Review
In Kimbrough v. UnitedStates,127 the Court considered whether a district
court's sentence that fell outside of the advisory Guidelines because of its
cocaine Guidelines was reasonable under
disagreement with the crack/powder
28
Booker's standard of review.1
At sentencing, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 228 to 270
months. 129 Had the defendant been involved with powder cocaine, rather than
crack cocaine, the defendant's Guideline range would have been 97 to 106
months.130 This disparity is due to the Guidelines' 100 to 1 ratio for powder to
crack cocaine.131 The district court pointed out the "disproportionate and unjust
effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing" and consequently
concluded that a sentence in the range of 228 to 270 months was "greater than
necessary" to meet the objectives of sentencing articulated in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).132 After considering the defendant's history and characteristics, the
nature of the offense, and the difference in Guideline ranges between offenses
involving crack cocaine versus powder cocaine, the court imposed a sentence of
180 months in prison plus five years of supervised release.' 33 The Fourth
Circuit vacated the sentence, following precedent that had established that a
123. Id.
124. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
125. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595.
126. Id. at 597.
127. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
128. Id. at 564. The government indicted the defendant for "conspiracy to distribute crack
and powder cocaine; possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine;
possession with intent to distribute powder cocaine; and possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug-trafficking offense." Id. The defendant pled guilty to all the charges. Id.
129. Id.at 565.
130. Id.
131. Id.at 564.
132. Id.
133.

Id
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sentence outside of the Guideline range resulting from a disagreement with the
34
crack to powder ratio was per se unreasonable.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, clarifying that all
Guidelines were advisory after Booker, even the cocaine Guidelines. 35 The
Supreme Court explained that "[a] district judge must include the Guidelines
range in the array of factors warranting consideration. The judge may
determine, however, that, in the particular case, a within-Guidelines sentence is
'greater than necessary' to serve the objectives of sentencing.,' 36 In considering
§ 3553(a) factors, a court may take into account the disparity in Guideline
ranges between crack and powder cocaine. 137 Therefore, the Supreme Court
38
found that the district court's sentencing decision was not unreasonable.

II. USE OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. The Viability of Watts
Although no U.S. Supreme Court case has directly addressed the question
of whether use of acquitted conduct offends the Sixth Amendment, the Court's
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence supports the conclusion that use of acquitted
conduct does indeed violate the Sixth Amendment. 39 Watts is the only case
that was presented with an issue arising out of acquitted conduct, but it did not
address the Sixth Amendment. 140 Additionally, the application of Watts should
be limited because
the Court "did not even have the benefit of full briefing or
41
oral argument.'
Although all federal circuits permit the use of acquitted conduct at
sentencing,142 some of them recognize the tension between Watts and the
134. Id.
135. Id. at 564.
136. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 576.
139. An argument could be made that it would also violate the Fifth Amendment, but this
is beyond the scope of the Article.
140. The Booker Court remarked on the limitations of Watts: "In neither Witte nor Watts
was there any contention that the sentencing enhancement had exceeded the sentence authorized
by the jury verdict in violation of the Sixth Amendment." United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 240 (2005).
141. Id.at240n.4.
142. See United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1736 (2008); United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 314 (1st Cir. 2006); United
States v. Farias, 469 F.3d 393, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d
366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Hayward, 177 F. App'x 214, 215 (3d Cir. 2006);
United States v. High Elk, 442 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vaughn, 430
F.3d 518, 525-27 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Price, 418 F.3d 771, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Ashworth, 139 F. App'x 525, 527 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v.
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Booker merits opinion. 143 For example, in United States v. Magallanez,144 the
Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether Booker and Blakely required the
sentencing court to accept the jury's special verdict on drug quantity, rather
than allowing the sentencing court to calculate the amount on its own. 14' The
circuit court conceded that "[a]t first blush, there might seem to be force to [the
defendant's] argument.' ' 146 It acknowledged that:
[t]he defendant in this case might well be excused for thinking that there is
something amiss, under this constitutional principle, with allowing the judge
to determine facts on which to sentence him to an additional 43 months in
prison in the face of a jury verdict finding facts under which he could be
required to serve no more than 78 months. 4

The court even went so far as to cite support 148 for the defendant's
Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 684-85 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297,
1304-05 (11 th Cir. 2005).
But Judge McKee's dissent raises an important point:
My colleagues in the majority find solace in the fact that the holding here "accords with the
decisions of each of our sister circuits that has addressed this issue." I am not nearly as
comforted by that fact as they. As I have noted elsewhere, "before Booker was decided, one
could have developed an even more impressive list of the courts that had incorrectly
concluded that Apprendi does not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines."
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 606 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (McKee, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 106 (2007) (citations omitted).
143. See United States v. Wilson, 232 F. App'x 540,543 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 638 (2007); United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1294 (1 th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,

128 S. Ct. 438 (2007); Mercado, 474 F.3d at 657; Farias,469 F.3d at 399-400; Hayward,177
F. App'x at 215; Dorcely, 454 F.3d at 372; United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1347-48
(11 th Cir. 2006); United States v. Poyato, 454 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11 th Cir. 2006); HighElk, 442
F.3d at 626; Vaughn, 430 F.3d at 525-27; Price,418 F.3d at 787-88; Ashworth, 139 F. App'x
at 527; Magallanez,408 F.3d at 683-85; Duncan, 400 F.3d at 1304-05.
144. 408 F.3d 672, 683 (10th Cir. 2005).
145. Id.at 683 -84.
146. Id. at 683.
147. Id.
148. The court acknowledged the holding in United States v. Pimental,367 F. Supp. 2d
143, 145 (D. Mass. 2005), that a sentence enhancement may not be imposed for acquitted
conduct. It also conceded the following:
[t]he constitutional violation identified in Blakely and Booker, after all, was the Sixth

Amendment right to trial by jury. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538-39; Booker, 125 S.Ct. at
746. As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Blakely, "the Sixth Amendment by its terms is
not a limitation on judicial power, but a reservation ofjury power." 124 S. Ct. at 2540. See
also id. at 2542 (noting the unfairness when a convicted defendant "see[s] his maximum
potential sentence balloon from as little as five years to as much as life imprisonment,
based not on facts proved to his peers beyond a reasonable doubt, but on facts extracted
after trial from a report compiled by a probation officer who the judge thinks more likely
got it right than got it wrong.").
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contention that the sentencing judge was required to abide by the jury's
findings. The court only concluded that the sentencing court was permitted to
consider other conduct rejected by the jury because it relied strictly on the
remedial majority opinion in Booker to reason that Booker did not alter 18
U.S.C. § 3661.49
Several district courts and individual judges in the circuits have questioned
the continued viability of Watts. Judge Barkett's concurrence in Faust
illustrates a reluctance to follow what she believed precedence required, while
fully appreciating that use of acquitted conduct violates Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. 150 Judge Barkett lamented, "I... concur in [the] sentencing
decision only because I am bound by Circuit precedent.... I strongly believe
this precedent is incorrect, and that sentence enhancements based on acquitted
conduct are unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment, as well as the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 15'
Further, Judge Gertner of the District of Massachusetts has pointed out:
United States v. Booker substantially undermines the continued vitality of
UnitedStates v. Watts both by its logic and by its words. It makes absolutely

no sense to conclude that the Sixth Amendment is violated whenever facts
essential to sentencing have been determined by a judge rather than a jury,
and also conclude that the fruits of 52
the jury's efforts can be ignored with
impunity by the judge in sentencing. 1
153
Others have echoed the same:

Magallanez,408 F.3d at 683.
149. Magallanez, 408 F.3d at 684-85; see also United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342,
1348 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying similar analysis: "We also note 18 U.S.C. § 3661, on which
Watts relied, remains intact post-Booker.Under § 3661, '[n]o limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate sentence.' Because the Supreme Court in Booker excised only two provisions of
the Sentencing Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and § 3742(e), see Booker, 543 U.S. at 259, it
follows that courts may still consider relevant facts concerning a defendant's 'background,
character, and conduct' when making sentencing calculations, even if those facts relate to
acquitted conduct.").
150. Faust,456 F.3d at 1349-50.
151. Id.at 1349.
152. United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 150 (D. Mass. 2005) (citation and
footnote omitted).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) ("In short, Watts has been 'explicitly disavowed by the Supreme Court as a matter of
Sixth Amendment law[and] has no bearing on [on the Sixth Amendment issue] in light of the
Court's more recent and relevant rulings."' (first alteration in original) (quoting Faust,456 F.3d
at 1349 (Barkett, J., dissenting))), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1736 (2008); United States v.
Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1349 (1 Ith Cir. 2005) (Barkett, J., concurring); United States v.
Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661, 676 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("The viability of Watts, however, was
questioned by Justice Stevens' constitutional majority opinion in Booker. While stating that
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A paradox is thus presented. Apprendi and its progeny, including Booker,
have elevated the role of the jury verdict by circumscribing a defendant's
sentence to the relevant statutory maximum authorized by a jury; yet, the
jury's verdict is not heeded when it specifically withholds authorization.
Stated differently, the jury is essentially ignored when it disagrees with the
prosecution. This outcome is nonsensical and in contravention ofthe thrust of
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts of
Appeal have attempted to reconcile this paradox, thereby upholding Watts'
validity, by focusing solely on the narrow remedial holding of Justice
Breyer's opinion.... [T]hese cases [are] unpersuasive and [] thejury's central
role in the criminal justice system is better served by respecting the jury's
findings with regard to authorized and unauthorized conduct. To consider
unauthorized conduct would be to denigrate wholly the right to a jury trial,
which is 54a "fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional
structure. 1
B. Booker's Sixth Amendment Motivation
Booker is a schizophrenic opinion.155 The only commonality between the
merits majority and the remedial majority is Justice Ginsburg. Because the
remedial opinion was written by the dissenting Justices (except Justice
Ginsburg) who concluded there was no constitutional violation in the first
place, it is not surprising that the two majority opinions are in conflict. Some

Watts is not 'inconsistent with today's decision,' Justice Stevens remarked that Watts did not
involve 'any contention that the sentencing enhancement had exceeded the sentence authorized
by the jury verdict in violation of the Sixth Amendment.'"); United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp.
2d 714, 721-22 (S.D. W. Va. 2005), affid, 491 F.3d 138 (2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1226
(2008).
154. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 670-71; see also Mercado, 474 F.3d at 661-62
(Fletcher, J., dissenting) ("While sentences that exceed the statutory maximum lack the
necessary jury authorization, so too do sentences that rely on conduct for which the jury has
explicitly withheld authorization. In both cases, the judge's sentence relies on a factual finding

not made by the jury, exposing the defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum to which he
would have otherwise been subject. By failing to consider the substantive impact that the
consideration of acquitted conduct has on the right to ajury trial, each of these decisions ignores
the impact of Jones, Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, and Booker. Thus, I am not content, as the
majority is, to join this 'parade of authority."')
155. Others have similarly diagnosed Booker. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Implementing
an Historical Vision of the Jury in an Age of Administrative Factfinding and Sentencing
Guidelines, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 291, 300 (2005) ("Let me explain what I mean when I advert to
the remedial incoherence or schizophrenia of Booker, and how that schizophrenia calls into
doubt the integrity and future of this whole line of cases."); Douglas A. Berman,
Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J. 387, 407 (2006) ("Not only did the Court's
schizophrenic results in Booker reveal the Justices' enduring division on sentencing issues, but
the Court's reasoning suggested a profound conceptual confusion in the minds of all the
Justices."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense ofApprendi andItsProgeny,37 McGEORGE L.
REv. 531, 544 (2006) ("Thus, the schizophrenia in Booker reflects history and not logic.").
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judges have recognized the internal inconsistency of the two majority opinions
in Booker56 and have begun to reject consideration of acquitted conduct
altogether. 57 More courts should follow their lead by consulting the merits
opinion in Booker, where the substantive discussion lies, in deciding the
constitutionality of using acquitted conduct at sentencing, rather than looking to
Watts or the remedial opinion in Booker.
The merits opinion in Booker is a more appropriate guide for courts
because it respects the Sixth Amendment. The merits majority's central concern
was to protect a defendant's right to a jury trial, specifically the right to have a
jury determine facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 158 As the merits majority
explained, it was motivated by "the need to preserve Sixth Amendment
substance.' 59 The Court invoked the historical underpinning of the Sixth
Amendment: "The Framers of the Constitution understood the threat of
'judicial despotism' that could arise from'arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary
convictions' without the benefit of a jury in criminal cases."' 160 As the Court
recognized earlier in Apprendi:
[T]o guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers, and
as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties, trial by jury has been
understood to require that the truth ofevery accusation, whether preferred in
156. See United States v. Henry, 472 F.3d 910, 918 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (observing that the remedial opinion was "[i]n some tension with the Booker
constitutional opinion"); United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282,286 (D. Mass. 2006)
("How logically to implement these two majority opinions has been a question with which the
lower federal courts have been grappling ever since."). Judge Michael McConnell of the Tenth
Circuit noted that "[t]he Booker opinions, taken in tandem, do not get high marks for
consistency or coherence ....
The most striking feature of the Booker decision is that the
remedy bears no logical relation to the constitutional violation." Michael W. McConnell, The
Booker Mess, 83 DENv. U. L. REv. 665,677 (2006).
157. United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1352 (1 th Cir. 2006) (Barkett, J., concurring)
("When a sentencing judge finds facts that could, in themselves, constitute entirely free-standing
offenses under the applicable law-that is, when an enhancement factor could have been named
in the indictment as a complete criminal charge-the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires that those facts be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); Kandirakis,441
F. Supp. 2d at 286; Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 668, 671; Pimental,367 F. Supp. 2d at 145;
Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 720; United States v. Carvajal, No. 04 CR 222AKH, 2005 WL
476125, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2005) ("I declined to accept the Government's argument that,
notwithstanding the jury's verdict that Carvajal was not guilty of actually distributing crack, I
should nevertheless consider that the acts necessary for completing the substantive crimes were
proved by a preponderance of the evidence."), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1097 (2008); United
States v. Huerta-Rodriguez, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1028 (D. Neb. 2005) ("[T]he court finds that
it can never be 'reasonable' to base any significant increase in a defendant's sentence on facts
that have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt."), afftd, 158 Fed. App'x 754 (8th Cir.

2005).
158.
159.
160.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005).
Id.
d at238-39.
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the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's] equals
and neighbours .... ,,161
The Court further explained that "the reliance on the reasonable doubt standard
among common-law jurisdictions reflect[s] a profound judgment
162 about the way
in which law should be enforced and justice administered."
These principles are equally applicable in considering the use of acquitted
conduct. It is a greater offense to the Sixth Amendment for a judge to supplant
the will of the jury after it has considered the "truth of [the] accusation" and
decided to acquit. Indeed, allowing arbitrary punishment upon
nonconviction-or worse, upon an affirmative refusal to convict-represents the
ultimate form of judicial despotism.
Use of acquitted conduct at sentencing would not only contravene the
historical foundation of the Sixth Amendment, but also ignore the impact of
Apprendi and its progeny. As the Court definitively declared in Blakely, "the
'statutory maximum' for Apprendipurposes is the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant."'164 The merits majority in Booker reaffirmed this
declaration, and nothing was changed by the remedial opinion. A post-Booker
court's finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
committed the acquitted conduct still violates the principles of Apprendi
because it is not reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.
Blakely clearly defined "statutory maximum":
[T]he relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose
without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the
jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts "which
the law makes
essential to the punishment," and the judge exceeds his proper
165
authority.
Under advisory Guidelines, judges use acquitted conduct to enhance a
defendant's sentence from one advisory Guideline range to another. In doing
so, judges exceed their authority when they impose a sentence that relies on
factual findings contrary to the jury's verdict because it exposes the defendant
to punishment beyond what the defendant would have otherwise received.
Some contend that when the remedial majority in Booker severed and
excised the mandatory language in the Guidelines, the sentencing ranges within

161.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (alterations in original) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).
162.

Id. at 478 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

163. Id. at 477.
164. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
165. Id. at 303-04 (citation omitted).
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the Guidelines no longer set the maximum permissible sentence. 166 The
argument is that, under the advisory Guidelines, the maximum sentence
corresponds with the statutory maximum specified in the U.S. Criminal Code.
Thus, there is no "enhancement," and thus, no Sixth Amendment violation.
However, this argument is flawed for two reasons. First, it mirrors a similar
argument previously rejected in Blakely. In Blakely, the state attempted to
distinguish the case from Apprendi by arguing that the relevant "statutory
maximum" was a 10-year maximum established for class B felonies of which
the defendant was convicted, rather than a 53-month maximum. 67 The state
argued that because the "exceptional" sentence imposed by the court fell within
the 10-year maximum,16there
was no Apprendi violation. 68 This argument failed
9
Court.
to persuade the
Second, the argument ignores the reality of Booker. As the Court pointed
170
out in Ring, "The dispositive question.., is one not of form, but of effect.'
The effect of Booker is that courts may and do enhance a sentence under the
advisory Guidelines. Courts still use the pre-Booker "enhancement"
terminology when they compute sentences under advisory Guidelines. 171
As long as the Guidelines continue to impact sentencing, even in an
advisory form, use of acquitted conduct raises Sixth Amendment concems. Had
Booker returned sentencing to the pure indeterminate state prior to the
Guidelines, then perhaps the Sixth Amendment might not be implicated. But as
Booker and Gall made clear, this is not the case-judges must still consider the
Guidelines. In Booker, the remedial Court clarified its ruling:
Without the mandatory provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take
account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals. The Act
nonetheless requires judges to consider the Guidelines sentencing range
166. See, e.g., United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 564 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 106 (2007) ("The excision of these provisions rendered the Guidelines
advisory, freeing the trial judge to impose any sentence permitted under the United States Code
using the calculated Guidelines range as only one of the seven considered factors. The
maximum legislatively authorized punishment to which the defendant is exposed is no longer
the maximum prescribed by the Guidelines; instead, it is the maximum prescribed by the United
States Code. Therefore, findings of fact relevant to the Guidelines need not be submitted to a
jury." (citations omitted)); United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("[T]he
Booker remedial opinion expressly endorsed 18 U.S.C. § 3661, concluding that it poses no
Sixth Amendment problem. Section 3661 provides, 'No limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate sentence" and permits a sentencing court to consider acquitted conduct."'
(citations omitted)).
167. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).
171. An electronic search of cases reveals that 383 federal cases still refer to sentencing
"enhancement" after Booker.
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established for ... the applicable category of offense committed by the
applicable category of defendant, the pertinent Sentencing Commission
policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities, and
172
the need to provide restitution to victims.
Also, Gall instructed that "a district court should begin all sentencing
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.... [T]he
Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark." 7 1 In fact,
even though the Guidelines are advisory, a miscalculation of the Guideline
range can be grounds for appeal. 74 Gall advised that "[the appellate court]
must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range.' 17 5 Moreover, the cases following Booker, such as Rita v. United
States 76 and Gall, have centered on whether within Guideline sentences or
outside Guideline sentences are reasonable. The Court has required that if the
sentencing judge "decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he
must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is
sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.' 77 Thus, the
practical effect of Booker is that the Guideline ranges still play a predominant
role in sentencing procedures.
Although the merits majority conceded that the Sixth Amendment would
not be implicated if the Guidelines were advisory, 178 the Guidelines are not
"advisory" in the pure meaning of the word. The post-Booker Guidelines are
shadows that loom over judges at sentencing from which judges cannot
separate without providing justifications. 179 The Guidelines can be more
appropriately characterized as "coercively advisory." Therefore, since courts
must accurately calculate Guideline ranges and provide detailed justification for
their rejection of the Guidelines in their sentencing decision, the Sixth
Amendment is still implicated even under advisory Guidelines.
And because Booker requires consideration of the Guidelines, the
maximum sentence is still set by the "advisory" Guidelines. As previously
stated, judges may not impose any sentence, even if it is within the maximum
of the U.S. Code, without first calculating the Guideline range. Aggravating
172.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60 (second alteration in original) (citations and intemal

quotation marks omitted).
173.

Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007).

174.
175.

Id.at 597.
Id.

176.

127 S.Ct. 2456 (2007). The Court held that appellate courts may apply a presumption

of reasonableness when reviewing a district court's sentence that falls within the Guidelines
range. Id.at 2459.
177. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597.
178. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
179. United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 335 (D. Mass. 2006) (perceiving
the "pervasive shadow the so-called 'advisory' Guidelines continue to cast over federal
sentencing today").
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and mitigating factors still operate to increase or decrease a defendant's
sentence from one range to another. A deviation below or above the Guideline
range requires ajustification, much like before Booker. Therefore, the advisory
Guidelines in effect set the maximum sentence and that sentence can be
enhanced from one advisory range to another. Consequently, when the sentence
is enhanced through consideration of acquitted conduct, the Sixth Amendment
is violated.
C. The Remedial Majority'sAvoidance Maneuvers in Booker
Refusal to use acquitted conduct at sentencing is consistent with the
substantive and remedial opinions in Booker. This section addresses frequently
asserted justifications that invoke the remedial portion of Booker to continue
consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing.
Had the solution been to engraft the Sixth Amendment onto the Guidelines,
the remedial opinion would be logically consistent with the merits opinion, and
that would be the end of the inquiry-use of acquitted conduct would clearly be
impermissible. However, the remedial majority objected to this solution
because of concerns about increasing prosecutorial discretion, the limitation on
judges to consider real conduct, and the complexity of charging documents and
jury fact-finding. But these objections are not applicable in the case of acquitted
conduct.
The remedial majority was concerned that attaching a Sixth Amendment
requirement onto the Guidelines would make sentencing too dependent upon
prosecutorial charging discretion. The remedial Court expected that this change
would limit the availability of information:
Such a system would have particularly troubling consequences with respect to
prosecutorial power. Until now, sentencing factors have come before the
judge in the presentence report. But in a sentencing system with the Court's
constitutional requirement engrafted onto it, any factor that a prosecutor
chose not to charge at8the
plea negotiation would be placed beyond the reach
0
of the judge entirely.'
In the case of acquitted conduct, however, any limitation on the court's ability
to consider information regarding acquitted conduct would not be the result of
prosecutorial discretion, but rather of jury deliberation. Therefore, the
prohibition against using acquitted conduct would not create an imbalance of
power between the court and prosecutor, as the remedial Court feared.
Additionally, the remedial Court reasoned that engrafting the jury trial right
to the Guidelines would prevent judges from considering real conduct. The
Court explained, "Congress' basic statutory goal-a system that diminishes
sentencing disparity-depends for its success upon judicial efforts to determine,
and to base punishment upon, the real conduct that underlies the crime of
180.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 256-57.
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conviction.'' Related to the need to consider real conduct was the concern
that engrafting the Sixth Amendment to the Guidelines would prevent judges
from 8considering
information that may not have been available until after the
2
trial.1
Again, these concerns are not present when acquitted conduct is prohibited
from use at sentencing. The need to consider real conduct at sentencing arose
out of prosecutorial discretion to withhold or dismiss charges at the charging
stage and plea negotiation stage, 18 3 which minimized the amount of information
presented to the court for sentencing consideration. To cure this situation, the
relevant conduct provisions afforded judges an opportunity to consider "real
conduct" that would otherwise be unavailable to the court. However, this
concern has no bearing on consideration of acquitted conduct because acquitted
conduct results from the affirmative act of the prosecutor to test the case at trial,
not from the prosecutor's concealment of information. Acquitted conduct is the
quintessential manifestation of the prosecutor's disclosure of informationinformation disclosed via the charging document and via trial. There is no new
information related to acquitted conduct to warrant a court's reconsideration at
sentencing; the government had the opportunity to fully present its case at trial.
Moreover, the need to consider real conduct was to reduce unwarranted
disparity among convicted offenses, not acquittals.' 8 4 Therefore, because a trier
of fact previously had the opportunity to consider the conduct underlying the
acquitted crime, there is no justification for its reconsideration at sentencing.
Another argument advanced by the remedial majority was that attaching a
Sixth Amendment requirement onto the Guidelines would be contrary to 18
U.S.C. § 3661. That provision states: "No limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. ' ' 18 ' But this
language is not as sweeping as some would contend. Limitations on the
information that judges may consider already exist, such as when a defendant's
conviction results from constitutional violations, like the right to counsel. The
Supreme Court held in Burgett v. Texas,
To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwrightto be
used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for
181. Id.at250.
182. See id at 251 ("Judges have long looked to real conduct when sentencing. Federal
judges have long relied upon a presentence report, prepared by a probation officer, for
information (often unavailable until after the trial) relevant to the manner in which the convicted
offender committed the crime of conviction.").
183. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?,40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1204-05
(1993) (pointing out that the decision to include uncharged conduct resulted from the
Commission's concern over prosecutorial discretion and charge bargaining).
184. See discussion infra at Part V.B.4.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006).
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another offense is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, since the
defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused
86
in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.1
Even in an era when judicial discretion was broad, the Court reaffirmed Burgett
in United States v. Tucker to prohibit use of prior uncounseled felony
convictions to enhance a sentence. 187 A prohibition against use of acquitted
conduct at sentencing would be consistent with the logic ofBurgett and Tucker.
It makes little sense that uncounseled felony convictions are prohibited from
use to enhance sentences but acquittals may be considered.
Also, it is illogical that in answering the question of whether the use of
acquitted conduct at sentencing violates the Sixth Amendment, some would
rely on 18 U.S.C. § 3661 to argue that because the statute prohibits limitation
on information, the practice does not result in any constitutional violation. Ifthe
constitutional question is answered first, then 18 U.S.C. § 3661 is irrelevant.
Surely, if the issue came up regarding whether use of an uncounseled felony
conviction violates the Sixth Amendment, it would be illogical to respond that
because 18 U.S.C. § 3661 prohibits limitations on information a judge may
consider, use of an uncounseled felony conviction does not violate the Sixth
Amendment. Section 3661 should be consulted only after determinations of
constitutional violations and other prohibitions have been made. Thus, 18
U.S.C. § 3661 does not make available all conduct for sentencing
consideration, does not answer the constitutional question, and consequently
should not be a ground for making acquitted conduct open for reconsideration
at sentencing. 18
Last, the remedial majority in Booker decided against engrafting the Sixth
Amendment protection onto the Guidelines because it would make charging
documents too complex, which in turn would be too difficult for a jury to
understand.1 89 These concerns are not present with acquitted conduct. First, in
instances involving acquitted conduct, the prosecutor has already resolved
charging issues, which rebuts the concern of unwieldy charging documents.
Second, the jury, by virtue of being able to render a verdict, has proven that the
charges are not too complex. 190 Therefore, an acquittal is a manifestation of the

186. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (citation omitted).
187. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,447-49 (1972).
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006).
189. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 254-55.
190. A study conducted by the National Center for State Courts found that "[i]n general,
most juries did not appear to view their trials as highly complex. And most jurors confidently
said that it was easy to understand the evidence, expert testimony, and judicial instructions."
Valerie P. Hans et al., The Hung Jury: The American Jury's Insights and Contemporary
Understanding,39 CRM. L. BULL. 33, 44 (2003). In instances when the juries found the case
difficult to understand, it was more likely that a hung jury would make this conclusion than one
that reached a verdict. Id.
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prosecutor's ability to charge and the jury's ability to evaluate the evidence,
consider the charges, and arrive at a decision. Third, "the interest in fairness
and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial-a common-law right that
defendants enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth
Amendment-has always outweighed the interest in" efficiency and
expediency.191
In sum, a reliance on the remedial majority to answer the constitutional
question regarding acquitted conduct ignores the essence of the Sixth
Amendment protection afforded in the merits opinion. The remedial opinion
should be a guide for questions about the advisory nature of the Guidelines and
appellate procedure, while the merits opinion should be the source for questions
relating to the constitutionality of sentencing.
III. JUDICIAL NULLIFICATION OF JURIES

A. Illustrationsof JudicialNullification
1. Special Verdicts
Courts justify consideration of acquitted conduct based on Watts, relying
on the oft-quoted statement, "An acquittal can only be an acknowledgment that
the government failed to prove an essential element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Without specific jury findings, no one can logically or
realistically draw any factual finding inferences .... ,,192 Yet when specific jury
findings exist, sentencing courts continue to disregard the jury's findings. In
instances when special verdicts have been issued by the jury or when the jury
has delivered a verdict relating to lesser included charges, consideration of
acquitted conduct amounts to jury nullification that cannot be supported by
Watts.
For example, in United States v. Magallanez,193 it was possible to
determine the exact facts found by the jury because the jury received a special
94
interrogatory to determine the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant.'
Among the choices were "0- 50 grams, 50- 500 grams, and over 500 grams."' 195
The jury found that the defendant was responsible for 50- 500 grams, which
96
would have exposed him to a sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. 1
Despite the jury's findings, the district court attributed 1.21 kilograms of drugs
to the defendant using a preponderance of the evidence standard, thereby

191. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
192. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1996)).
193. 408 F.3d 672 (10th Cir. 2005).

194.

Id. at 682.

195.
196.

Id.
d. at 682- 83.
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97
exposing him to a sentencing range of 121- 151 months.'
Similarly in United States v. Vaughn,198 the sentencing court also rejected
the jury's findings. The jury returned a special verdict that found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of"at least fifty kilograms...
but not more than 100 kilograms" of marijuana. 199 At sentencing, the court
supplanted the jury's findings by attributing 544 kilograms of marijuana to the
defendant. °°
Another example is United States v. Duncan.20° The jury found by special
verdict that the defendant was guilty of conspiracy involving "five kilograms or
more of cocaine [powder], but found that the government failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy involved fifty grams or more of
cocaine base [("crack")]. 2 °2 When the court sentenced the defendant, the court
found that the defendant had converted a portion of the cocaine powder into
12.24 kilograms of cocaine base.0 3 If the court had respected the jury's verdict
and sentenced the defendant solely for the cocaine powder, the defendant's
base level would have been thirty-two. 2° However, because the court
considered the acquitted conduct, it raised the defendant's base level to thirtyeight and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.2 °5
The jury's special verdict can assist judges to "logically or realistically
draw ...factual finding inferences," thereby making the distinction in Watts
between acquittal and innocence that was premised on the absence of special
findings inapplicable.20 6 It is readily apparent that the jury did not believe the
defendant was responsible for more than 500 grams in Magallanez, for more
20 7
than 100 kilograms in Vaughn, or for more than cocaine powder in Duncan.
In these cases, the special verdicts were clear and the defendants' acquitted
conduct should not have been a part of the sentencing. Allowing a judge to
find, simply by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of additional
drugs in these cases negated the purpose of a special verdict. In fact, this
practice would cause special verdicts to become obsolete at trial since judges
would use their own judgment to find the probable existence of facts.

197. Id. at 682.
198. 430 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2005).
199. Id. at 521.
200. Id.at 526.
201. 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005).
202. Id. at 1300.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (quoting United States v. Putra, 78
F.3d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1996)).
207. See United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Magallenez, 408 F.3d 672, 682 (10th Cir. 2005); Duncan, 400 F.3d at 1300.
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2. Lesser Included Offenses
Another instance where one can make a logical inference from the jury's
findings is when a jury declines to find a defendant guilty of a higher level
offense and chooses instead to convict on the lesser included offense. United
States v. Coleman20 8 provides an example. In Coleman, the government
charged defendants with five counts of introduction of an unapproved new drug
into interstate commerce. 0 9 The jury found that the defendants lacked the intent
to defraud or mislead as required for the felony offenses, but it convicted the
defendants of the lesser included misdemeanor offenses of introduction of an
unapproved new drug into interstate commerce without intent to mislead or
defraud. 210 Additionally, the defendants were tried for three felonious counts of
introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce.21 ' Again, the jury
rejected the allegation that the defendants intended to defraud or mislead and
acquitted the defendants of the felony charges, but it convicted the defendants
on the lesser included misdemeanor offense of introduction of misbranded
drugs into interstate commerce without intent to defraud or mislead.2?1 2 The
government also charged one count of failure to register a drug manufacturing
facility. 213 Once more, the jury found that the defendants did not have the
requisite intent to defraud or mislead and acquitted on the felony charge, and it
only convicted defendants of the lesser included misdemeanor charge of failing
to register a drug manufacturing facility without intent to defraud or mislead.2'
Finally, the defendants faced three counts of misbranding drugs while held for
sale after shipment in interstate commerce.2 15 Once again, the jury acquitted the
defendants on the felony offense that required intent to mislead or defraud and
found defendants guilty of the lesser included misdemeanor offense.216 The jury
also acquitted the defendants on one count of conspiracy and six2 17counts ofmail
fraud but convicted them on two counts of adulterating drugs.
At sentencing, the presentence investigation report recommended increases
to the defendants' base level because their conduct involved fraud. 218 The
government argued that Watts supported the sentence enhancement for fraud if
the government proved that fact by a preponderance of the evidence.21 9 Judge
Marbley rejected the government's contention:
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

370 F. Supp. 2d 661 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
Id. at 663.
Id. at 663 -64.
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663 -64.
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 669.
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[T]he jury exercised its power and, after four days of deliberation, found
Defendants... not guilty of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and found that
they acted without intent to defraud or mislead, a prerequisite to felony
violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333, and 355. Here, the verdict is clear: the
jury unequivocally found Defendants not guilty on seven counts ofmail fraud
and found that Defendants did not have the intent to defraud or mislead on
thirteen counts.220
The court concluded that "considering acquitted conduct would disregard
completely the jury's role in determining guilt and innocence. 22'
The approach used by Judge Marbley demonstrates the more reasoned
approach that should have been applied in Magallanez, Vaughn, and Duncan.
Whether in the case of special verdicts or lesser included offenses, the jury's
verdict is clear and should be respected. Applying a preponderance of the
evidence standard to acquitted conduct in these instances would contravene the
reasoning in Watts.
3. Judicial Nullification Resulting from General Distrust of Juries
The use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in Magallanez,
Vaughn, and Duncan, where the jury's findings were made unambiguous
through special verdicts,222 constitutes a total disregard of the jury's findings.
One problem with using acquitted conduct as a basis for sentencing, as
identified by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Brady,2 23 is that "any time a
judge disagreed with the jury's verdict, the judge could 'reconsider' critical
elements of the offense to avoid the restrictions of the Guidelines and push the
sentence to the maximum-in effect punishing the defendant for an offense for
which he or she had been acquitted. 224 Although United States v. Watts
overruled Brady by permitting courts to consider acquitted conduct in
sentencing, 225 the Supreme Court neglected to address the concern about
220. Id.at671-72.
221. Id. at 672. Had the government been successful in convincing the court to enhance the
defendants' sentence for fraud, it would have increased their base level by seven levels. Id. at

672 n.15.
222. See United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672,682 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1300
(11 th Cir. 2005).

223. 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991).
224. Id. at 851-52.
225. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997). Watts found the following:
The Court of Appeals [in Brady] likewise misunderstood the preclusive effect of an
acquittal, when it asserted that ajury 'reject[s]' some facts when it returns a general verdict
of not guilty. The Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance of the different
standards of proof that govern at trial and sentencing. We have explained that "acquittal on
criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the
existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt." As then-Chief Judge Wallace pointed out
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judicial nullification of juries, as raised in Brady.226
228
227
UnitedStates v. Juarez-Ortega exemplifies the reality of this concern.
In Juarez-Ortega,the jury convicted the defendant of two counts of distribution
of cocaine but acquitted him of the charge of carrying a firearm during a drug
trafficking offense. 22 9 At the time of arrest, the firearm was in the physical
possession of the codefendant. 230 As to the codefendant's charges, the jury
convicted him of the two counts of distribution and one count of possession of
a firearm. 23 1 At sentencing, the court was incredulous over the jury's acquittal
of Juarez-Ortega for the firearm count.232 Despite the defense attorney's
explanation that the acquittal could have been the result of the jury's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, which they were charged to do
per jury instructions, the court refused to consider these explanations and
concluded that the jury was simply wrong, as shown by the dialogue below:
THE COURT: The jury could not have made-the jury could not have
listened to the instructions.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor,THE COURT: The testimony was so strong. The gun was even in the
apartment. That's all they needed. There was no dispute of that fact. The
mere fact that that gun was in the apartment, being used in association
with-he didn't have to have it on his person.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: They perhaps didn't believe it was being used in
association with drug-related activity, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you something: I have been disappointed injury
verdicts before, but that's one of the most important ones, because what it did,
it set up a disparity in result between the two defendants. Your client was
consistently selling cocaine from his apartment and using a firearm. The fact
is that the officers came in and testified that it was in your client's waistband
in his dissent in Putra,it is impossible to know exactly why a jury found a defendant not
guilty on a certain charge.
"[A]n acquittal is not a finding of any fact. An acquittal can only be an
acknowledgment that the government failed to prove an essential element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Without specific jury findings, no one can
logically or realistically draw any factual finding inferences .. "
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' assertion in Brady, the jury cannot be said to have
"necessarily rejected" any facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty.
Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
226. See Brady, 928 F.2d at 851-52.
227. 866 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1989).
228. For other discussions about this case, see Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries,
UnderminingJustice: Lessons from Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SuFFoLK U. L. REv.
419, 434 (1999) [hereinafter Judge Gertner, CircumventingJuries];Johnson, supra note 32,
197-99; Reitz, supra note 11, at 531-33.
229. Juarez-Ortega,866 F.2d at 748.
230. Id. at 747.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 748-49.
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and described, had an officer on the stand, a man who is an ATF agent, who
is capable and knows what a firearm looks like, telling them, "This is what I
saw."
There is no reason for him not to have seen that, since it's undisputed that the
firearm was in the apartment and it's undisputed that the firearm was used in
connection with drug sales and used [for] the purpose of protecting drug
sales. And then here in number twelve, there is no doubt at all that the firearm
was brought for him. It's all a pattern. This firearm was used. They had to
absolutely disregard the testimony of a government agent for no reason-no
reason.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Perhaps they considered the testimony of the other
agent who testified that he couldn't be sure, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, you can take it up with an appellate court, because I've
made my findings on the record.
Do you have anything further you'd like to say?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, your Honor, other than we would hope the
court would follow the guidelines as set forth in the pre-sentence
investigation, that being the guidelines of from twelve to eighteen months of
determining the sentence of Mr. Ortega.
THE 23COURT:
All right. The court is going to disregard the guidelines in this
3
case.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the sentence despite clear indications
that the trial court supplanted the jury's verdict.234 The trial court imposed the
identical sentence for Juarez-Ortega, who had been acquitted of the firearm
count, as it imposed for the codefendant, who had actually been convicted of
the firearm possession. 235 The Fifth Circuit explained that it was not an abuse
of discretion because "[t]he sentencing court was not relying on facts disclosed
at trial to punish the defendant for the extraneous offense, but236to justify the
heavier penalties for the offenses for which he was convicted.,
Juarez-Ortegarepresents a distrust ofjuries and the discretion judges may
exercise to question the competency ofjuries. 2 37 Juarez-Ortegaraises troubling
questions. It is contradictory to accept the jury's verdict regarding one charge
but to discount it as to another. The jury's conviction demonstrates the jury's
ability to effectively marshal the evidence and determine facts.238 Why does the
court at sentencing suddenly question the jury's competency? 23 9
233. Id.
234. Id.at 749.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. In fact, there are reasons to suggest that a jury may be better suited to determine facts
than judges. See discussion infra Part III.C.
238. As one judge observed, "Juries are fully capable of addressing evidence provided to
them, even scientific evidence.... Judge Michael H. Marcus, Post-BookerSentencing Issues
for a Post-Booker Court, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 227,228 (2006); see also Hans, supranote 190,
at 12.
239. Ironically, defendants fare better being tried by a judge rather than a jury. In 2004,
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Moreover, another troubling aspect of considering acquittals at sentencing
is the one-sidedness of the act. 40 Courts trust the jury's work when the jury
renders a guilty verdict. However, only in instances of acquittals do some courts
feel free to second-guess the jury.24' If in fact a court were justified in doubting
the competency of the jury and conducting a quality control-like measure by
reevaluating the facts at sentencing, then it would make more sense to use the
highest standard-proof beyond a reasonable doubt-not the lowest one.
B. The Roles Juries Serve in Society and Consequences ofNullifying Juries
1. Protection Against Tyranny
The use of acquitted conduct at sentencing invites courts to nullify juries
and risks undermining the vital roles that juries serve in the justice system.
Juries are essential to the checks and balance system built into our democratic
government. The Supreme Court has recognized that the jury was "designed 'to
guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,' and 'was
from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the
great bulwark of their civil and political liberties.
Alexander Hamilton
judges had an acquittal rate of 71% as compared with juries acquitting in 21% of the jury trials.
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at 62
(2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0404.pdf. In 2004, there were
2,313 jury trials and 490 acquittals by juries, and 317 bench trials and 226 acquittals byjudges.
Id.
240. See Lear, supranote 183, at 1205 (observing that inclusion ofnonconviction offenses
at sentencing may be a corrective measure to address prosecutorial or jury errors, but the
"adjustment for 'accuracy' never results in a lower sentence. It is a one-way adjustment-up.").
241. The National Center for State Courts conducted a study on juries, with a particular
focus on hung juries. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM?
(2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResJuriesHungJuries
ProblemPub.pdf In its study, the NCSC found that when juries convict, judges agree with the
conviction 93.7% of the time. Id.at 55-56. However, when juries acquit, judges agree in 70.3%
of the cases. Id. These rates have not changed significantly since 1966 when Kalven and Zeisel
conducted their ground breaking study of 3,576 criminal trials for judge-jury agreement, as
encapsulated in HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISAL, THE AMERICAN JURY 10, 56 (1966).
242. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1995) (citations omitted); accord
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) ("A right tojurytrial is granted to criminal
defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.... Providing an accused with the
right to be tried by ajury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant
preferred the common-sense judgment of ajury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic
reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the
Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official
power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one
judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal
Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence." (footnote omitted)).
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expressed in Federalist No. 83 the importance ofjuries in protecting liberty:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial of jury ....
[A]II are satisfied of the utility of the institution, and of its friendly aspect to
liberty. .

.

. Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of prosecuting

pretended offences, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions
have ever appeared to me to be the great engines
243 ofjudicial despotism; and
these have all relation to criminal proceedings.

To facilitate a system of checks, the Framers constructed ajudicial system
wherein each player had a specific role. As early as 1628, it was understood
that the judge was charged with the duty to decide the law and the jury with the
duty to decide facts. 244 The Framers feared a concentration ofjudicial power.245
Allowing judges to reconsider facts at sentencing-that have previously been
For more perspectives on the historical the role ofjuries, see Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1187 (1991); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial
Fact-finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097,
1123-33 (2001); Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of the
Sentencing Guidelines,38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345, 378-81 (2005); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury
Sentencing as Democratic Practice,89 VA. L. REV. 311, 317-30 (2003); Chris Kemmitt,
Function Over Form: Reviving the Jury's HistoricalRole as a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 93, 98- 111 (2006); Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decisionon Sentencing
FactsAfter Booker: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach the Sixth Amendment, 39 GA. L.
REv. 895, 901-02 (2005); Lear, supra note 183, at 1223-37.
243. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 443- 44 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. R. Pole ed., 2005).
244. See United States v. Jones, 526 U.S. 227,247 n.8 (1999). But see Rachel E. Barkow,
Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory
Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 33, 48-49 (2003) (recognizing that a criminal defendant's

constitutional right to demand that a jury decide guilt or innocence on every issue grants a jury
the power to apply the law to facts); Kirgis, supra note 242, at 904 ("The black-letter rule of
common-law procedure at that time was that juries decide questions of fact and judges decide

questions of law. In fact, the evidence suggests that fine distinctions between fact and law were
seldom drawn and that juries were given broad latitude to decide all issues in a case, legal or
factual.").
245. See Gardina, supra note 242, at 378-81 ("The Framers assumed the intra-branch
check was necessary because federal judges, although protected from political pressures by
Article III's tenure and salary requirements, were, in the end, government employees. In the
words of one Anti-Federalist, 'Judges, unincumbered by juries, have been ever found much
better friends to the government than to the people.' The Framers identified the jury as playing a
major role in protecting ordinary citizens against judicial participation in governmental
oppression. Jurors would be drawn from the community and were not permanent government
officials on the government payroll. The inclusion of the jury within Article Ill was a natural

outgrowth of the Framers' experience that judges, acting withoutjuries, would participate in the
oppression of the people." (footnotes omitted)); Iontcheva, supra note 242, at 317-28 (noting

that the use of sentencing juries was seen as "a better safeguard against unfair sentences than a
single judge" and was likely a response to "a more general fear of unelected judges, who were
perceived as elitist and unresponsive to popular wishes").
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determined by ajury-gives judges a type of concentrated, absolute power that
interferes with the roles envisioned by the Framers.
The Framers' confidence in the jury system has been enshrined throughout
parts of the Constitution. Article HI and the Sixth Amendment manifest the
confidence that the forefathers had in juries to try crimes and determine issues
of fact. Article III secures the right to ajury trial for federal crimes: "Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury., 24 6 The Sixth
Amendment provides a similar right: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district ....
247 The Framers, through the Seventh Amendment
provision for jury trials in civil matters, similarly entrusted juries with
determining facts in civil cases: "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the trial by jury shall be preserved...
, 248 The Eighth Amendment, through the Double Jeopardy clause, protects the
finality of jury decisions. 249 These provisions in the Constitution embody the
Framers' confidence in the jury's ability to try cases and determine facts, be it
in criminal or civil trials. Therefore, judicial determination of facts previously
determined by juries intrudes upon the province of the jury and the finality of
jury acquittals that the Framers sought to safeguard.
2. Substantive Check on the Law
A related societal benefit is that juries function as a substantive check on
the law. As one commentator explains, juries, through their authority to acquit
defendants, act as a corrective measure to rein in overinclusive laws 25 ° and hold
prosecutors and law enforcement to a higher standard. Legislatures exhibit a
tendency and preference to write overinclusive laws, as opposed to
underinclusive ones, because they trust prosecutors
to use their discretion not to
25 1
prosecute cases that should be weeded out.
Juries act as a final check should cases undeserving of punishment pass
through the prosecutorial sieve. Jury acquittals provide the legislature with
concrete examples, as derived from the facts of the cases, of when the law may
be applied unjustly and signal the legislature to redraft poorly written laws.2 2
For example, jury acquittals of defendants for first-degree murder to avoid the
mandatory imposition of the deathpenalty
resulted in a positive change in the
3
law for more humane punishment. 5
Like the check on overinclusive laws, juries also serve as a check on the
246.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. amend.VI.
U.S. CONST. amend.VII.
249. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
250. See Barkow, supra note 244, at 61-65.
251. Id. at62 -63.
252. Id. at 82.
253. Id. at 79.

247.
248.
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behavior of prosecutors and law enforcement. A jury acquittal may send a
similar signal to law enforcement and prosecutors to change their conduct.2 54
However, the force of the acquittal is blunted and the message muffled when
judges can trigger punishment for otherwise acquitted conduct. Prosecutors and
law enforcement may feel vindicated if a defendant can suffer additional
punishment for the acquitted conduct, rather than perceiving the acquittal as a
rejection of the prosecutorial and law enforcement actions. Allowing judges to
sentence based on acquitted conduct diminishes the corrective role of the jury
on the legislature, prosecutors, and law enforcement and perpetuates the
existence of overly broad laws.
3. Reinforce Democratic Norms
Another benefit derived from the jury system is that "[j]ury participation
serves the dual purposes of reinforcing democratic norms by encouraging
citizen participation in administration of the criminal justice system. ' ' 25 As
acknowledged by the Court, "Community participation in the administration of
the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage
but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system., 25 6 A judge's consideration of acquitted conduct as a basis for
sentencing on other conduct perverts the jury system and undermines public
confidence in the justice system. As Judge Nancy Gertner reminds us,
The jury is intended to be the centerpiece of the criminal justice system.
Determining "more than actual truth, guilt, or innocence, its decisions
represent a popular conception of a 'just verdict."' In effect, juries rule on
"legal guilt, guilt determined by the highest standard of proof we know,
beyond a reasonable doubt. And when a jury acquit[s] a defendant based on
that standard, one would have expected no additional criminal punishment
would follow." 257
By second guessing the jury's findings, the court mocks the work of the
jury and sends a message that the jury has wasted its time.25 s

254. See Lear, supranote 183, at 1233 (arguing that use of acquitted conduct at sentencing
undermines the jury's ability to influence law enforcement decisions through nullification).
255. Johnson, supra note 32, at 184.
256. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
257. United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 150 (D. Mass. 2005) (citation
omitted) (quoting Judge Gertner, CircumventingJuries,supra note 228, at 433).
258. See Federal Criminal Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers,
supranote 57, at 1486; Johnson, supra note 32, at 185.
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C. Reasons Against Judicial Nullification: The Superiority of
Jury Fact-Finding

1. Jury Diversity
Judicial determination of sentencing facts underlying acquitted conduct
undermines the role served by juries, as well as eviscerates the benefits ofjury
fact-finding that result from diversity, group dynamics, and neutrality. Federal
juries come from a cross-section of society, bringing with them a rich diversity
that is useful in deliberations. Courts and Congress have recognized that
to
selecting a petit jury from a cross-section of the community is fundamental 259
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the administration of justice.
Consequently, Congress declared in 28 U.S.C. § 1861 that "[i]t is the policy of
the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial byjury shall
have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes," and allowed district courts to randomly select juries from voter
registration lists, lists of actual voters, and city directories.2 60 These methods of
selection ensure that a fair cross section is available for choosing petit juries,
and in turn for choosing juries.
On the other hand, the federal judiciary represents a narrow section of
society. In November 2008, the racial composition of the federal judiciary was
as follows: 91.7% White, 4.8% African American, 2.8% Hispanic American,
0.5% Asian American, and 0.06% Native American. 26' From 1945-2000, the
259. See Ballewv. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,233--34 (1978); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528-30;
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
260. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994). Congress articulated the plan for random selection in 28
U.S.C. § 1863 (b)(2), requiring district courts to take the following actions:
specify whether the names of prospective jurors shall be selected from the voter
registration lists or the lists of actual voters ofthe political subdivisions within the district
or division. The plan shall prescribe some other source or sources of names in addition to
voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights secured by sections
1861 and 1862 of this title. The plan for the District of Columbia may require the names of
prospective jurors to be selected from the city directory rather than from voter lists. The
plans for the districts of Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone may prescribe some other source
or sources of names of prospective jurors in lieu of voter lists, the use of which shall be
consistent with the policies declared and rights secured by sections 1861 and 1862 of this
title. The plan for the district of Massachusetts may require the names ofprospective jurors
to be selected from the resident list provided for in chapter 234A, Massachusetts General
Laws, or comparable authority, rather than from voter lists.
261. See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (follow "The Federal Judges Biographical Database"
hyperlink; then select "Race or Ethnicity" query; then select each race from the drop-down
menu) (last visited November 18, 2008). In November 2008, there were the following numbers
of judges in each race: 153 African American, 17 Asian American, 90 Hispanic American, 2
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average age of the judges on the federal judiciary was 61-65 years. In terms
of gender, 91.4% of the judges were male; 8.6% were female.263
In contrast, in 2007, Whites represented 66% of the general U.S.
population, Hispanics 15%, Blacks 12%, and Asians 4%.26 Also in 2007, the
gender composition of the U.S. population was 49.3% male and 50.7% female,
and the median age was 36.6 years.265
As Blackstone recognized, ajury composed of the "middle rank" provides
a benefit superior to a single judge:
[I]n settling and adjusting a question of fact, when intrusted to any single
magistrate, partiality and injustice have an ample field to range in; either by
boldly asserting that to be proved which is not so, or by more artfully
suppressing some circumstances, stretching and warping others, and
distinguishing away the remainder. Here therefore a competent number of
sensible and upright jurymen, chosen from among those of the middle rank,
will be found the best investigators oftruth, and the surest guardians of public
justice.266
The diversity represented by juries from the "middle rank" "may protect 'legal
innocence' differently from the judge through its factfinding responsibility."
Because the jury is selected from a fair cross section of the community, it is
Native American, and 2906 White. Id.The percentages were calculated by dividing from the
total of 3,168 judges. Id.
262. Albert Yoon, Love's Labor Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges:
1945-2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1048 (2003).
263. See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://
www.jc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (follow "The Federal Judges Biographical Database"
hyperlink; then select "Gender" query; then select "Male" or "Female" from the drop-down
menu) (last visited November 18, 2008). In November 2008, there were 2894 male judges and
274 female judges, totaling 3,168 federal judges. Id.
264. U.S. Census Bureau, National Population Estimates - Characteristics, National Sex,
Race, and Hispanic Origin, http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2007-srh.html
(follow "Excel" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 18, 2008). The percentages were calculated by
dividing from a total population of 301,621,157. Id.
265. U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Tables, DP-1 General Demographic Characteristics,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTIable?_bm'y&-qrname'PEP_2007_ESTDP 1&geo id'01OOOUS&-dsname'PEP_2007_EST&-_lang'en&-format'&-CONTEXT'qt
(last
visited Jan. 19, 2009). The percentages were calculated by dividing from a total population of
301,621,157. Id.
266. Daniel P. Collins, Making Juries Better Fact Finders, 20 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y

489, 491 (1997) (quoting

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

3 COMMENTARIES *380); see also Taylor v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("The purpose of ajury is to guard against the exercise of
arbitrary power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge
against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of ajudge. This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the
jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace ..." (citation omitted)).
267. Barkow, supra note 244, at 72.
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more likely to reflect community values and views on crime and the criminal
justice system than judges, for whom there is no similar cross section
requirement. As judicial profiles have shown, judges do not, as a group,
represent the social, economic, racial, or gender characteristics of the
communities in which they serve.268
2. Group Dynamics and Jury Competency
Juries, as a group, offer additional benefits over the individual
determination of a judge. Research reveals that "[g]roups may . . have an
advantage over individuals in decisions involving judgments (or evaluation)
rather than decisions involving selecting between two alternatives because
groups are better at taking multiple factors into account.,, 269 Additionally, as
would be expected, the collective memory ofjurors is superior to that of one
individual. 270 The group dynamic of juries further contributes to the
effectiveness of fact finding because "jurors learn from each other in the
process of deliberation and perhaps reach solutions that would not have
occurred to them individually. Deliberative results are also more informed in
that they are better targeted to the individual case.",2 7 1 Furthermore,
comparisons between group deliberation and individual decision-making have
shown that groups produce more accurate results because groups
counterbalance the prejudices of individuals 272 and were more motivated and
self-critical.273 Thus, as supported by empirical evidence, there is a direct,
27 4
positive correlation between group size and productivity and performance.
Although the expectation might be that training makes judges better
factfinders, no conclusive empirical evidence supports this assumption.275 The
268. See id.
269. Robinson & Spellman, supra at 50, at 1144.
270. Kirgis, supra note 242, at 945.
271. Iontcheva, supra note 242, at 341; see also Robinson & Spellman, supra at 50, at
1143 -44 ("To the extent that all information is shared by the group, however, the group may
have a larger information base than an individual judge, and therefore may be better at
Eacfinuhlg.").
272. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,233-34 (1978), Kirgis, supranote 242, at 946;
Iontcheva, supra note 242, at 363 -64.
273. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 233-34.
at 233 n. 1 (1978) (citing Thomas & Fink, Effects of Group Size, 60 PSYCH.
274. See id.
BuLL. 371, 373 (1963) (concluding that a larger group size was superior, under all conditions, to
a smaller sized group concerning performance and productivity)).
275. See Robinson & Spellman, supraat 50, at 1138-40 (2005) (noting the inadequacy of
field studies and that few judges participate in laboratory studies, which leads to a lack of
research on judicial factfinding performance); see also Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence:
Speculation andDataAboutthe Acquitted, 42 AM. CluM. L. REV. 1167, 1193 (2005) ("There is
no empirical support for the view that a single professional is better at determining credibility
than a group of amateurs sharing information. The studies can and do demonstrate that
professionals arrive at similar judgments about who is telling the truth, but they do not
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observation made by the Court in Ring that "the superiority of judicial
factfinding in capital cases is far from evident ' 276 can also be said of judicial
factfinding generally. As the Court in Blakely pointed out, "Our Constitution
and the common-law traditions it entrenches, however, do not admit the
contention that facts are better discovered by judicial inquisition than by
adversarial
testing
before
jury. ' ,2 7 7 ofjury
Judge factfinding:
Young of the District of
Massachusetts
pointed
out thea reliability
[T]he conclusions of twelve lay people who have examined the evidence and
deliberated thereon are more likely to be correct (and accepted) than the
pronouncement of a single, jaded and calloused employee of the state.
Moreover, unlike the Court, which must consider extra-evidence data such as
the pre-sentence report, if the only data relied upon by the jury are those that
pass muster under the Federal Rules of Evidence (which themselves exist to
serve truth-seeking),
the result reached is likewise more likely to be
278
accurate.

Additionally, studies show that the general assessment ofjury competency by
experienced litigators and judges is high. One study conducted by the National
Center for State Courts found that "[o]verall, judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys rated the jurors positively on
how well they understand the
279
evidentiary and legal issues in the case.,
Also, although some may criticize the use ofjuries as factfinders because of
the potential to be influenced by pretrial publicity, appearance of witnesses and
defendants, and inadmissible evidence, no research proves that judges are
immune from these same factors.28° In fact, it has been long recognized that
even the most influential members of society are susceptible to inherent
prejudices. As a Constitutional Convention delegate wrote, "Prejudice,
resentment, and partiality, are among the weaknesses of human nature, and are
demonstrate that these judgments are more accurate than those arrived at by non-professionals.
If anything, the judgments are likely to be less accurate since they are made according to shared
professional norms which are themselves without sound empirical basis.")
276. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002).
277. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3
COMMENTARIES

*373- 74, *379- 81).

278. United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 324 (D. Mass. 2006) (citation
omitted).
279. Hans, supra note 190, at 44-45. Interestingly, questions ofjury competency generally
do not arise unless there is a hung jury. Id.at 12-13 ("[O]nce the jury hung, judges and
prosecutors (but not defense attorneys) expressed concern about juror comprehension of the
evidence and law. It is important to note that this rating came after the jury reached a verdict or
hung, so courtroom personnel might have been taking the result into account as they search for a
reason for a hung jury.").
280. Robinson & Spellman, supra at 50, at 1138-40; see Barkow, supra note 244, at 75
(pointing out the susceptibility of juries to acquit on the basis of the race of the defendant but
recognizing that these same dangers are present with any actor authorized with discretion).
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28
apt to pervert the judgment of the greatest and best of men." '
Furthermore, even ifjudges are more consistent, that consistency does not
translate into findings that "are closer to the truth than the one-time-only jury
finding., 282 Rather, "consistency can be the downside of experience. Having
seen many trials, judges may develop schemas for certain 'types' of trials.
These schemas may create expectations.... Thus, judges might misconstrue
the facts of one case based on similarity to previous cases when such an
inference is not warranted., 283 Motivated by the goal of consistency, judges
may be unable to recognize a past error or that justice demands a deviation
from the past. Also, the repetition of overseeing jury trials and sentencing
hearings may numb judges to the devastatingly life-altering impact of a
criminal trial. The value unique to a jury may lie in its one time performance
and ability to offer a fresh perspective without the burden of an institutional
track record.

3. Jury Neutrality
Public perception ofjuries as being neutral is another reason to protect the
jury's acquittal. A 1998 study revealed that the public has high confidence in
juries: 90% of people "believe the criminal jury system was somewhat or very
fair. ' ' 284 Participants in another study "rated juries higher than judges in terms
of fairness, accuracy, lack of bias, and the representation of minorities. 2 85 A
1999 study by the American Bar Association showed that 80% of survey
respondents agreed, that "in spite of its problems, the American justice system
is still the best in the world., 286 The study credited juries for the public's
confidence in the justice system: "[T]he root of this support seems to lie in the
jury system, as more than three-quarters, 78%, say it is the fairest way to
determine guilt or innocence, and more than two-thirds,
287 69%, believe that juries
are the most important part of our justice system.'
This trust in the jury enhances the justice system because the public's trust
leads to greater acceptability of the jury's decision.288 Professor Kirgis explains,

281. Collins, supra note 266, at 490-91.
282. Robinson & Spellman, supra at 50, at 1142.
283. Id.
284. Iontcheva, supra note 242, at 349.
285. Barkow, supra note 244, at 84 n.225 (citing Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The
Basis of Citizens' Perceptions of the CriminalJury: ProceduralFairness, Accuracy, and
Efficiency, 12 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 333, 338 tbl.2 (1988)).
286. AM. BAR ASS'N, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/perceptions.pdf.
287. Id. at 6-7.
288. Kirgis, supranote 242, at 945; see also Iontcheva, supra note 242, at 342 ("Because
the deliberating group hears and considers diverse opinions and remains free to choose among
them, the result carries legitimacy, even when the outcome does not satisfy all points of view.").
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A community is more likely to accept verdicts when the decisions reflect or
incorporate societal norms. The jury, as both the symbolic and actual
representative of the community, is more likely to render verdicts based on
widely accepted standards than are other authorities. The shared
responsibility of ajury verdict also aids its acceptance within the community.
When a single judge makes a legal determination that produces
dissatisfaction, the discontent centers on that individual decision maker. The
displeased can see the outcome as resulting from one person's whims,
caprices, prejudices, stupidity, or lack of common sense. With the shared
accountability of a jury's decision, however, the locus of any discontent is
more diffuse and, consequently, less intense.289
Therefore, the unique benefits of jury fact-finding and the roles served by
juries are considerations against judicial nullification, which occurs when
judges find facts that underlie acquitted conduct.
IV.ADDITIONAL POLICY REASONS AGAINST CONSIDERING
ACQUITTED CONDUCT
A. Doing the Time Without Doing the Crime
Consideration of acquitted conduct in effect is punishing a defendant for a
crime that he did not commit. In In re Winship, the Court declared:
"Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the
Government has borne the burden of... convincing the factfinder of his
guilt." To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it
"impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of
certitude of the facts in issue. 290
But the "relevant conduct" portion of the advisory Guidelines permit judges to
consider the defendant's conduct that a jury has already acquitted, thereby
exposing the defendant to an additional loss of liberty that a defendant
otherwise would not have to endure.
Courts have predicated the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing on the
distinction provided in Watts that a court is not punishing a defendant for the
acquitted conduct but rather is "increas[ing] his sentence because ofthe manner
in which he committed the crime of conviction.",291 To the public, the
defendant, and even lawyers, it is difficult to see the significance of this
legalistic and hyper-technical distinction when acquitted conduct has been the
292
basis of extreme increases in sentences. Relevant conduct can potentially add
289. Kirgis, supranote 242, at 945 (2005) (citing RANDOLPHN. JONOKArr, THE AMERICAN
JURY SYSTEM 76 (2003)).

290. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970).
291. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.148, 154 (1997).
292. See O'Sullivan,supra note 57, at 1375 ("To many, the distinction between a sentence
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up to 18 points to the base offense level for fraud or tax evasion, 20 points for
theft, and 36 points for drug offenses.293 These points make a sizeable
difference in a defendant's sentence-an increase of 36 points could turn an
initial sentence of probation into a mandatory life sentence.294
UnitedStates v. Lombard 295 serves as the ultimate example of the drastic
impact that consideration of acquitted conduct can have on a defendant's
sentence. In that case, defendants Lombard and Hartley were tried separately in
the Maine Superior Court for murder.296 The juries acquitted them both. Later,
the federal government indicted them for firearms and other charges related to
the murders. Hartley pled guilty to the charges, but Lombard did not and was
convicted by a jury on two charges, 297 one being the illegal possession of a
firearm by a three-time convicted felon.298
At sentencing, the district court found that Lombard had used the firearm to
commit the murders for which he had been previously acquitted. 299 The district
court reached this conclusion as a result of a cross-reference in the Guidelines.
The Guideline provision governing illegal possession of a firearm made a cross
reference to another provision, instructing the court to apply the base offense
level of the offense in which the defendant had used the firearm.300 The district
court determined that the firearm had been used in connection with the state
murders, and conse uently, Lombard received a sentence consistent with a
murder conviction. 0 The Guidelines required a sentence of life imprisonment,
but the Maine law would not have mandated such a sentence if Lombard had
been convicted. 0 2
Lombard's sentence for the firearm conviction was the very sentence that
would have been imposed had he been convicted of a federal murder charge,30 3
yet he had not been indicted for murder in a federal court nor could he have
been. Without consideration of the murders, Lombard's sentence would have
been 262-327 months. 304 Although the First Circuit later held that section
5K2.0 of the Guidelines granted the district court the discretion to depart
downward,30 5 the district court, on remand, reimposed the life sentence.
enhancement for nonconviction conduct and 'punishment'
'semantic."').

for that conduct appears

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

United States v. Wong, 2 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 1993) (Norris, J., dissenting).
Id.
United States v. Lombard (Lombard 1), 72 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1995).
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id.at 174.
Id.at 172.
Id.at 174-75.
Id.at 172.

302.
303.
304.
305.

Id.
Id.at 178.
Id.
at 172.
Id.

306.

United States v. Lombard (Lombard II), 102 F.3d 1,2 (1st Cir. 1995).
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United States v. Concepcion provides another example of how acquitted
conduct can dramatically increase a defendant's sentence, thereby increasing
the deprivation of the defendant's liberty.30 7 The government charged defendant
Frias with conspiracy to distribute heroin, using a firearm in relation to drug
trafficking, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of an
unregistered firearm.3 °8 The jury acquitted Frias ofthe heroin conspiracy charge
and the charge for use of a firearm in relation to narcotics trafficking but
convicted him of possession of an unregistered firearm and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. 30 9 Despite the two acquittals, however, the district
court found by clear and convincing evidence that he engaged in the heroin
conspiracy and by a preponderance of the evidence that he used a firearm in
connection with the conspiracy, 310 consequently increasing his sentencing
exposure to a range of 210 to 262 months (171/2 to 22 years).3 1 If Frias had
been convicted of all four charges, his sentencing range likewise would have
been 210 to 262 months (171/ to 22 years).312 If his sentence had been based
solely on the convicted conduct, he only would have been exposed to a range of
12 to 18 months (1 to 11/2 years). 1 Thus, sentencing for relevant conduct
increased his sentencing exposure by 24 levels (from level 12 to level 36).314
Consideration of acquitted conduct in Concepcion subjected the defendant
to potentially the same sentence as he would have received had he actually been
convicted by the jury of all charges.315 Similarly, in Lombard, such
considerations exposed the defendant to a mandatory sentence equaling the
maximum that state law would have sanctioned had he been convicted of
murder.3 16 In the face of Lombard and Concepcion, the distinction articulated
307. 983 F.2d 369, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'dsub nom. United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d
391, 392 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Another example is UnitedStates v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624,
635 (D.C. Cir. 1992), where the court increased the defendant's sentence more than six-fold
based on acquitted conduct. In Boney, the defendant was convicted of one count to distribute
.199 grams of cocaine and acquitted of possession with intent to distribute 12.72 grams of
cocaine. Id. Despite the acquittal, the court sentenced the defendant for a combined weight of
12.919 grams, which resulted in a sentencing range of 63 to 78 months. Id. Had the defendant
been sentenced solely for the conduct for which he had been convicted, he would have faced a
range of 10 to 16 months. Id.
308. Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 376.
309. Id.
310. Id. at385-86.
311. Id. at389.
312. Id. at 393 (Newman, J., concurring). Only three charges affected Frias's sentence:
conspiracy to distribute heroin, possession of an unregistered firearm, and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. Id. The Second Circuit rejected an additional upward adjustment
for the offense of possession of a firearm in connection with the conspiracy because it would be
an "impermissible double-counting." Id. at 389-90 (majority opinion).
313. Id. at 389.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 393 (Newman, J., concurring).
316. United States v. Lombard (Lombard I), 72 F.3d 170, 179 (1st Cir. 1995).
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in Watts upon which courts hinge their practice of considering acquitted
conduct is illusory.
Because of the dramatic impact that consideration of acquitted conduct can
have on a defendant's liberty, it is by no means a trivial matter. Although the
current plea rate of 95.8%31 shows that fewer cases proceed to trial, data on
acquittals is not negligible. In 2004, 0.86% of federal cases (716 out of 83,391
cases) resulted in acquittals; 318 in 2003, 0.89% of federal cases (760 out of
85,106 cases) resulted in acquittals. 319 Based upon this rate, a minimum of 700
defendants in each of those years could have been affected by the use of
acquitted conduct at sentencing.
The extent to which consideration of acquitted conduct can adversely affect
a defendant's sentence is not isolated to instances of acquittals in federal court.
As seen in Lombard,an acquittal in state court can be used against a defendant
in federal court. 320 Additionally, an acquittal that occurs subsequent to a
defendant's conviction may also impact the defendant's revocation hearing in
either state or federal proceedings. 32 A defendant on probation can be arrested
and imprisoned for additional time if it is determined at the revocation hearing,
generally by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed a
new violation despite the resulting acquittal.322 The precise number of
acquittals in state courts is difficult to ascertain, but one commentator estimated
that in 1996, there were as many as 13,000 acquittals nationwide.32 3 Therefore,
acquitted conduct could potentially affect thousands of federal defendants.3 24
317. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.C (11 th
ed. 2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/FigC.pdf.
318. In 2004, there were 490 acquittals byjuries and 226 acquittals by judges. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICs, 2004, at 62 (2006), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0404.pdf.
319. In 2003, there were 478 acquittals by juries and 282 acquittals byjudges. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003, at 62 (2005), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs03.pdf.
320. Lombard 11, 102 F.3d at 2.
321. Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent,AcquittedDefendant,94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1297, 1333 (2000).
322. See, e.g., State v. Gibbs, 953 A.2d 439, 441-42 (N.H. 2008) (concluding that
although acquitted conduct may not be considered at sentencing, such acquitted conduct may be
considered for revocation of probation hearings because probation is intended to be remedial).
323. See Leipold, supra note 321, at 1327. In 1996, there were 61,000 federal criminal
cases, and the acquittals rate was 1.6%. Id. In 1994, the rate of acquittals in state courts for the
75 largest counties in the country was 1% for felony cases. Id. Leipold assumed the same rate of
acquittal nationwide, and out of approximately 1,348,608 state felony defendants in 1996, he
estimated 13,000 acquittals. Id. at 1327 n. 107.
324. This statement assumes an intersection of state acquittals with federal convictions and
it assumes that the misconduct was in the same course or scheme. There is no way to know the
total breadth of the effect of acquitted conduct on federal sentencing without reviewing the
judgment and sentence of each convicted defendant, which totaled 72,765 in 2007. See U. S.
SENT'G COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (12th ed. 2007),
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B. ProsecutionGets a Second Bite and Bootstrapping
A second reason against consideration of acquitted conduct is that the
practice of sentencing a defendant based upon acquitted conduct affords the
government "a second bite at the apple. 325 "Consideration of acquitted conduct
skews the criminal justice system's power differential too much in the
prosecution's favor" 326 by providing prosecutors with the ability to enhance
sentences using conduct that previously failed the scrutiny of a jury. Having
had a test run of the case at trial, the prosecution can perfect its case at
sentencing with the added benefits of (1) proving its case using the lowest
standard of proof, and (2) having a new trier of fact.327 Additionally, the
prosecution can introduce evidence that ordinarily would be inadmissible at
trial because the rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing. 328 Moreover, at
sentencing, a defendant
loses the right to confront witnesses, a right that is
afforded at trial.329
availableat http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/nat07.pdf. Because the data maintained by the
Commission does not track the impact of acquittals, no information is available regarding the
number of cases in which sentences have been enhanced due to acquitted conduct from a federal
or state court or the degree of enhancement.
325. United States v. Wendelsdorf, 423 F. Supp. 2d 927,938 (N.D. Iowa 2006); see also
Johnson, supra note 32, at 182- 83.
326. United States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661, 672-73 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
327. See Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: BifurcatedFact-Finding
Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines andthe Limits ofDue Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REv.
289, 351 (1992) (arguing that use of acquitted conduct violates the Double Jeopardy Clause
because the "defendant will suffer additional anxiety from being made to run the gauntlet a
second time. It is also thought that with practice, the prosecution may perfect its techniques and
gain an unfair advantage in meeting its burden of proof in the second proceeding."); Reitz,
supranote 11, at 551 ("Acquittal charges must be defended twice, and the defense must be more
vigorous the second time around because the available procedures are more spare. On policy
grounds, we should question the wisdom of requiring those accused of crime to 'run the
gauntlet' of successive proceedings, apart from the unseemliness of ignoring the jury's
decision.").
328. FED. R. EviD. 1 101(d)(3). For example, in United States v. McCrory, police broke
down an apartment door and searched the defendant's apartment without a warrant. United
States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The search yielded crack cocaine,
weapons, paraphernalia, and a sum of money. Id. at 65. Because the defendant argued that the
search violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the government agreed not to present any
evidence seized at the apartment in its case-in-chief Id. However, at sentencing, the government
used this evidence as relevant conduct to argue for an upward adjustment. Id. Consideration of
the illegally obtained evidence raised the defendant's sentencing range from 27-33 months to
235-293 months. Id. at 66. The district court sentenced the defendant to 235 months. Id. Had
the evidence been lawfully obtained, a conviction based on the lawful evidence would have
resulted in a sentencing range of 248-295 months. Id. By obtaining a sentence similar to one
that could have resulted only from a legal seizure and a successful trial, the government suffered
nothing for violating the defendant's constitutional rights.
329. See supra note 18.
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The Lombard case further illustrates the danger of permitting the
government to use acquitted conduct at sentencing. This case "raise[d] the
danger of the defendant's trial and conviction being turned into a means of
achieving an end that could not be achieved directly: the imposition of a life
sentence 'enhancement' based on a federally unprosecutable murder." 330 The
" '
murder charge was outside the jurisdictional reach of the federal prosecutors. 33
Because the "federal prosecution followed on the heels of [Lombard's state
court] acquittal, 332 the First Circuit aptly surmised the government's
motivation:
[It would ignore reality not to recognize that the federal prosecution arose
out of and was driven by the murders, and that the prosecution was well
aware that the Sentencing Guidelines would require consideration of the
murders at sentencing. This reality was reflected in the prosecution's
statement at the pre-sentencing conference that "it was quite clear from the
beginning; Mr. Lombard was looking at a life sentence." The government, by
its own words, had intended "from the beginning" that consideration of the
murders would result in a life sentence.333
By means of a lesser standard of proof at sentencing, federal prosecutors
achieved a sentence that the Maine prosecutors failed to obtain earlier-life
imprisonment, which was the maximum that the defendant could have been
sentenced had he been convicted under the Maine statute.334
Another example of the susceptibility of the Guidelines for misuse comes
in United States v. Wendelsdorf In Wendelsdorf, the defendant had been
acquitted of two different crimes in two different judicial proceedings--once in
state court and again in federal court.336 At sentencing, as the federal district
court observed, the government sought "to exact its 'pound of flesh"' for the
alleged criminal acts that had resulted in acquittals.33
The federal government attempted to use "two levels of acquitted
conduct" 338 to enhance the defendant's advisory guidelines range from
121-151 months to life in prison.339 The federal government charged the
defendant with two counts of drug-related conspiracy for two different time
periods. 340 The jury acquitted him of the first count of conspiracy but convicted
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

United States v. Lombard (Lombard I), 72 F.3d 170, 178 (1st Cir. 1995).
Id.at 174n.2.
Id.at 179.
Id.
Id.
423 F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
Id.
Id.at 929 & n. I (quoting WLLiAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc.

338.
339.
340.

Id.at 929.
Id.at 937.
Id.at 929.

1).
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him of the second count of conspiracy that involved five or more grams of pure
methamphetamine. 34 1 Notwithstanding the defendant's acquittal, the
government argued that the drugs involved in the first count should be
attributed to the defendant as conduct relevant to the convicted offense, and
thereby, the defendant's sentence should be enhanced.34 2 In addition, the
government sought an upward sentencing departure by attributing a murder to
the defendant, for which he had been acquitted in state court.34 3 The
government's objective was to increase the defendant's base offense level from
32 to 43 and his prior criminal history category from I to 111.344 The result
would have been life imprisonment, although the government admitted that,
under the federal drug conspiracy statute, the defendant could only be
sentenced to a maximum of forty years.345
The government attempted to increase the defendant's sentence by
bootstrapping the murder that was acquitted in state court to the conspiracy that
was acquitted in federal court, all to be considered as relevant conduct for the
convicted conspiracy. 346 However, as the district court pointed out, the facts the
government argued as relevant conduct were not facts that ordinarily relate to
the convicted offense, such as "the presence of a gun or the vulnerability ofthe
victim. ' 347 Consequently, the court rejected the government's contentions:
Such a result, in the eyes of this court, is untenable. In its discretion, this
court will not allow the Government-having failed to meet its burden of
proof not just once, but twice at trial-to get a second bite at the apple for
two, distinct and separate, criminal acts from the offense of conviction. In the
eyes of this court, such a result is an abomination of the Guidelines and
merely an 34
attempt
by the Government to relitigate and perfect its previously
8
lost cases.
These cases highlight the susceptibility of both the relevant-conduct
provisions and the preponderance of the evidence standard to manipulation.
The Guidelines provide prosecutors with an arsenal of tools that, when coupled
with the lowest standard of proof, can be manipulated to avoid the spirit and
protections of Winship and Booker. Even if only a few opportunistic
prosecutors would do so, manipulations raise concerns because of the gravity of
the enhancements that could result. As Judge Ambro has advocated:
[A] less manipulable rule should be set-that constitutional protections apply
not only to those facts that authorize the "statutory maximum" ...,but to
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id.
Id.at 930.
Id.at 930 & n.2.
Id.at 930.
Id.
Id.at 938.
Id.
Id.
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every fact (save prior convictions) identified by the law itself as deserving of
additional punishment, no matter what that fact may be called. Only in this
way can the principles of Apprendi-followed through in Blakely, Booker,
and, most recently, Cunningham-be fully respected.
C. A Death Sentence for Actual Innocence and Legal Innocence
Consideration of acquitted conduct means a death sentence for innocence.
The Watts Court concluded that without specific jury findings, no one can
surmise the jury's findings in an acquittal and consequently, an acquittal does
not equate to innocence. Additionally, according to Watts, "consideration of
information about the defendant's character and conduct at sentencing does not
result in 'punishment' for any offense other than the one of which the
defendant was convicted., 351 By allowing consideration of acquitted conduct at
sentencing, however, it is impossible for innocence to have any significance.
Watts "ignores cases in which the jury acquitted because of actual innocence,
failure of proof even by a preponderance of the evidence,
or the jury's
352
evidence."
the
against
acquit
to
prerogative
constitutional
Consider the case of Lombard. Although Lombard had already been
acquitted of the murders, imagine that years later DNA evidence provides
unequivocal evidence that he was not responsible for the murders. What then of
the murder enhancement? Must the defendant spend his entire life in prison
because, applying the logic in Watts, the life sentence is not punishment for the
murder but for the firearm charge? Because under Watts a jury's acquittal is an
insufficient declaration of innocence, must a defendant provide DNA-type
evidence in order to avoid an enhanced sentence?
Under Watts, it would seem that only if the sentencing court found that the
prosecution failed to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence at
sentencing can we begin to make inferences about the defendant's innocence.
Moreover, taking the rationale in Watts to its logical conclusion would mean
that a court could sentence a defendant who was acquitted on all counts,
because the jury's verdict is not a vindication of guilt and relevant conduct
could be established through a preponderance of the evidence. Of course this is
an absurd proposition, but there is no meaningful difference between this
proposition and the current practice of allowing acquitted conduct to be the
basis of a sentence for another charge.
Additionally, if an acquittal is not a sufficient indicator of innocence to
relieve a defendant of sentencing repercussions, then why not permit the jury to
349. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 574 (3d Cir. 2007) (Ambro, J., concurring).
350. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.148, 155 (1997) (per curiam).
351. Id. (quoting Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 401 (1995)).
352.

Federal Criminal Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers,

supra note 57, at 1486. A discussion about the government's failure to meet the requisite burden
of proof and jury nullification is beyond the scope of this Article. For excellent explorations of
these topics, see Leipold, supra note 321, and Givelber, supra note 275.
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acquit only when its verdict is 100% certain of innocence? Or why not require
the jury to complete special verdict forms when it acquits a defendant? The jury
could indicate whether the acquittal is the result of a belief that the defendant is
innocent rather than simply the result of a belief that the government failed to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.353 Because the Watts Court
determined that "it is impossible to know exactly why a jury found a defendant
not guilty on a certain charge" and that "the jury cannot be said to have
'necessarily rejected' any facts when it returns a general verdict of not
guilty, ' 354 carrying Watts to its logical conclusion would require a special
verdict of innocence in order for a defendant to avoid a sentence enhancement
based on acquitted conduct. Otherwise, we should just lessen the government's
355
burden to only require proof by a preponderance of the evidence at trial.
353. One commentator made a similar suggestion:
A defendant who has been acquitted of criminal charges, or who has had the charges
against him dismissed, should have the statutory right to ask for a determination that he is
factually innocent. If a defendant is acquitted in a bench trial, or if the charges are
dismissed prior to trial, the defendant should be permitted to ask the judge for a finding
that, not only has the government failed to prove guilt, but also that the evidence shows his
innocence. If the case is tried to a jury, the defendant should be allowed to request that the
jurors be given three verdict options: guilty, not guilty, and innocent. If either the court or
jury makes a determination of innocence, the defendant's record related to that charge
should be expunged, and should be inadmissible in any future proceeding.
Leipold, supranote 321, at 1300.
Interestingly, some state and local governments have given the fullest weight to
acquittals by allowing acquitted persons to request their records be sealed after an acquittal. See
John P. Sellers III, Sealed with an Acquittal: When Not Guilty Means Never Having to Say You
Were Tried, 32 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 1-3 (2003) (arguing against the sealing of records in
acquittals when there is a public interest). In Cincinnati, once a record is sealed, no evidence of
a trial having taken place exists. See id.
at 1. Police officers are prohibited from disclosing their
knowledge of the investigations, and violators are subject to misdemeanor prosecution. See id.
at 2. In California, the acquitted person's record may be expunged after proving to the court that
"no reasonable cause exists to believe that the arrestee committed the offense for which the
arrest was made." Leipold, supranote 321, at 1324.
354. Watts, 519 U.S. at 155.
355. The requirement of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard at trial originated
with In re Winship, where the Court held that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt at the adjudication stage of ajuvenile proceeding. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-65
(1969). In deciding the case, the Court relied on the nation's historical practice:
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal
procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake
interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty
upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every
individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable
doubt about his guilt.
Id.at 363-64.
Although a defendant who is convicted of an offense does not suffer additional stigma
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Accordingly, the underlying message of Watts undermines the foundation
of our criminal justice system. Watts defies the basic principle that it is better to
let a guilty defendant go free than to imprison an innocent person. The Watts
Court reasons that the lack of specific jury findings in an acquittal leaves open
the possibility that an acquitted defendant is not innocent and, therefore, may
be punished for such conduct.35 6 Yet, the Watts Court never acknowledges the
corollary-that a defendant may actually be innocent-and by failing to do so, it
sanctions imprisoning the potentially innocent. One may argue that a
subsequent finding at sentencing, by preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant committed the acquitted act negates the possibility of innocence.
However, such an argument would ignore the reality of exonerated defendants
who previously had been convicted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Exonerations reveal the fallibility of the justice system even when defendants
have been afforded the right to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to
confront witnesses, and to have inadmissible evidence excluded. A sentencing
system that allows for a determination of guilt by a lesser standard of proof and
omission of other critical rights is even more fallible.357
from consideration of acquitted conduct, the additional liberty restriction that can result from
the acquitted conduct may have a greater impact than the stigma of a conviction or the sentence
that would have been imposed for the convicted offense, alone.
356. Watts, 519 U.S. at 155.
357. Some appellate courts' characterizations of fact-finding at sentencing demonstrate the
unreliability of factual determinations of "guilt" that occur at sentencing. Examples include the
following: "far reaching," "nothing more than a guess," "arbitrary," "founded on the bare
assumption unsubstantiated," "nebulous eyeballing," "create[d]," "bas[ed] on hunch," "based on
conjecture," "pulled out of thin air," and the result of"choos[ing]a random number." See, e.g.,
United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 194 F.3d 224,232 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[T]he inferential leap
in the instant case is founded on the bare assumption unsubstantiated, if not directly
undermined, by record testimony."); United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 780 (1st Cir.
1998) ("[W]e cannot uphold a drug quantity calculation on the basis of hunch or intuition.");
United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 530 (7th Cir. 1998) (criticizing the fact finding in United
States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir. 1995), for figures that were "pulled out of
thin air"); Henderson, 58 F.3d at 1152 (noting that "the [district] court explicitly stated that its
10% multiplier may have been an arbitrary figure" and concluding that the district court "could
not appropriately choose a random number simply because it believed more drugs were involved
than the sales indicated"); United States v. Baro, 15 F.3d 563, 569 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he
sentencing judge may not, without further findings, simply sentence a defendant based on
conjecture."); United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
district court's approximation was "improper and a violation of Walton to simply 'guess"');
United States v. Garcia, 994 F.2d 1499, 1509 (10th Cir. 1993) ("To find that these particular
shipments were of average size is nothing more than a guess and clearly insufficient to carry the
government's burden."); United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255, 1265 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Factual
determinations under the Guidelines need not emulate the precision of Newtonian physics, but
nor may they be based on the kind of nebulous eyeballing employed in the report."); United
States v. Hewitt, 942 F.2d 1270, 1274 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding the district court's "assumption
to be far reaching" when it calculated additional amounts of drugs based on a probation officer's
report that relied on a detective's representation that the defendant admitted making prior drug
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Currently, there is no method in place to determine how often acquittals
result from the jury's belief that the defendant is innocent versus other
explanations. However, we can glean some information from what we know
about the wrongfully convicted. There have been 227 persons exonerated as a
result of post-conviction DNA evidence.358 But this number does not reflect the
actual number of wrongfully convicted persons because, in some cases, DNA
evidence may not be available, the state may not admit this type of evidence, or
DNA evidence may not be relevant to the case-for example, a perjury charge.
One study estimated that approximately 0.5% of innocent people are
wrongfully convicted by plea or trial. 359 Given that there were 83,391 federal
criminal cases and 74,782 convictions in 2004,360 approximately 373 people
may have been wrongfully convicted.
This estimate shows that it is all the more likely that defendants are
acquitted because of their innocence, rather than because of other explanations.
Professor Givelber explains the following:
[Actual innocence] [a]t a minimum ... cannot be the least likely explanation
for a not guilty verdict. If there is a skill imbalance between adversaries, the
prosecutor is the one who typically enjoys the advantage. If there is probative
or even prejudicial evidence pointing towards guilt, the state is generally
successful in getting at least some of it before the jury. The prosecution can
secure testimony through promises that the defense cannot make. The police
are far more likely to find and produce recalcitrant witnesses on behalf of the
prosecutor than they are to do so for the defense. Reasonable doubt is, of
course, the defendant's friend, but the jury knows that the defendant would
not be present in court if the state did not believe he was a criminal. Actual
innocence provides at least as powerful [an] explanation for an acquittal as
any of the other reasons, and a more powerful explanation than most. We
don't acknowledge it because it is unpleasant to contemplate
361 innocent people
going to trial, not because it does not happen regularly.
V. PROPOSAL: REBIRTH OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO EFFECT
A REBIRTH OF INNOCENCE

A. Rebirth ofJudicialDiscretionafter Booker, Gall, andKimbrough
Booker represents a rebirth of judicial discretion. Although judges must
first consider the Guidelines, they can free themselves from such constraints by

trips, but without specifying the dates or amounts).
358. The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
359. Givelber, supra note 275, at 1199.
360.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,

at 62 (2006), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0404.pdf.
361. Givelber, supra note 275, at 1198.
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weighing other factors, such as the Sentencing Commission policy statements
and the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 362 A judge may
now reject a Guideline sentence by finding that a sentence within the
Guidelines is greater than necessary to fulfill the purposes of sentencing in §
3553(a), such as "to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, . . . provide

restitution to victims,.., reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect
for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the
with needed educational or
public, and effectively provide the defendant
363
care.,
medical
and
training
vocational
Gall has fortified this new judicial discretion by requiring that appellate
courts "give due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. The fact that the appellate
court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.''364 Once a
district court has shown compliance with the procedures outlined in Gall by
accurately calculating the Guideline range, considering § 3553(a) factors, and
adequately explaining its sentence and deviation from the Guidelines, 365 a
court's rejection of acquitted conduct should be given deference pursuant to
Gall.
Finally, the fact that, in Kimbrough, a sentencing decision that deviated
from the contentious cocaine Guidelines based on section 3553(a) factors
withstood appellate review reflects a new opportunity for judges to exercise
366
sentencing discretion. The Court's holding that a "judge may determine,...
that, in the particular case, a within-Guidelines sentence is 'greater than
necessary' to serve the objectives of sentencing ' 367 empowers judges to use
factors in § 3553(a) as a sword to reject acquitted conduct and a shield to
withstand appellate review of reasonableness.
B. Effecting a Rebirth of Innocence by Evaluating Sentencing Purposesto
Reject Use ofAcquitted Conduct
After Booker, Gall, and Kimbrough, judges now have an opportunity to
reestablish the legal significance once equated with acquittals, making legal or
actual innocence a possibility again. This section provides a proposal for judges
to use their new found discretion to reject the use of acquitted conduct because
it conflicts with the purposes of sentencing. The intent of this section is to offer
some considerations for judges to take into account when evaluating the
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005).
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. IV)).
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2008).
Id.
Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2008).
Id.
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purposes of sentencing articulated in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a).
Section 3553(a) of the Guidelines sets forth the factors to be considered in
sentencing:
(a) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE.-The court

shall

impose a sentence sufficient, but not greaterthan necessary, to comply with
the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in
determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of

similar conduct; and
368
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
1. Promote Respect for the Law
Use of acquitted conduct at sentencing risks creating a society that does not
respect the law. Consider the public's disbelief and outrage upon the revelation
that a person can be subject to the same punishment when acquitted as another
defendant who was actually indicted and convicted. As stated by one court:
What could instill more confusion and disrespect than finding out that you
will be sentenced to ... extra.. . years in prison for the alleged crimes of
which you were acquitted? The law would have gone from something
venerable and respected to a farce and a sham.
From the public's perspective, most people would be shocked to find out
that even United States citizens can be (and routinely are) punished for
crimes of which they were acquitted.369

Imposition of additional punishment for acquitted conduct can result in
368.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2003) (emphasis added). See generallyPaul J. Hofer & Mark H.

Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Findingand Using the Philosophy of the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines,40 AM. CIUM. L. REv. 19 (2003) (identifying the philosophy behind the
Guidelines and applying the philosophy to sentencing purposes). A discussion of the
rehabilitative purpose is beyond the scope of this Article.
369.

United States v. Ibanga, 454 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006).
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 296 2008-2009

2009]

JUDICIAL NULLIFICATION OF JURIES

"confusion as to the law, and confusion breeds contempt. ' '370
Research shows that two factors affect a person's contempt or respect for
the law: the credibility of the source and the strength with which the public
holds their own countervailing views.3 7' If a source is deemed more credible, it
is more likely to gamer respect and persuade, and if a person strongly holds a
particular view, that person is less likely to be persuaded.372 Applying these two
factors, the public will likely have an unfavorable view of a court's use of
acquitted conduct because the public firmly believes that punishment should
not result from acquittals.
Both courts and scholars have pointed out this public perception. As one
federal district court anticipated, "[a] layperson would undoubtedly be revolted
by the idea that, for example, a person's sentence for crimes of which he has
been convicted may be multiplied fourfold by taking into account conduct of
which he has been acquitted. 373 One commentator pointed out:
Most lawyers, as well as ordinary citizens unfamiliar with the daily
procedures of criminal law administration, are astonished to learn that a
person in this society may be sentenced to prison on the basis of conduct of
which a jury has
374 acquitted him, or on the basis of charges that did not result
in conviction.
Another commentator has remarked,
[A]lmost every lay person, regardless of political inclination, is shocked to
learn that a federal judge must increase a sentence based on conduct for
which the defendant has been acquitted.... [T]he reason for this shock is the
intuitive judgment that society's right to punish an individual flows directly
from, and is limited by, the conduct for which that individual has been
convicted.375
Additionally, the First Circuit gave a similar warning:

370. Id.
371. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453,
475-77, 485 (1997).
372. Id. at 485-86.
373. United States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661,671 n.14 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
374. Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1714 (1992).
375. David Yellen, Just Deserts and Lenient Prosecutors: The Flawed Casefor RealOffense Sentencing, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1434, 1437 (1997). For an international reaction to real
offense sentencing, see Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in
America, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1751, 1758 (1999) ("When I describe federal real offense
sentencing to lawyers and judges outside the United States, the reaction is always a combination
of incredulity and disapproval.").
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[M]anyjudges think that the guidelines are manifestly unwise, as a matter of
policy, in requiring the use of acquitted conduct in calculating the guideline
range. A lawyer can explain the distinction logically but, as a matter of public
perception and acceptance,
the result can often invite disrespect for the
37 6
sentencing process.

Finally, judges have remarked that "[s]entencing a defendant to time in prison
377
for a crime that the jury found he did not commit is a Kafka-esque result,"
that this practice is "unseemly and unworthy of the United States
' 379of
America," 37' and that the process "criminalizes activity 'on the cheap.'
As these remarks show, the general public, lawyers, and even judges hold
the strong belief that no one should suffer punishment for conduct of which
they have been acquitted. Thus, a conflict exists between the law and this
376. United States v. Lombard (Lombard II), 102 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J.,
concurring) ("Some of our own judges have recognized that this justification could not pass the
test of fairness or even common sense from the vantage point of an ordinary citizen. The 'law,'
however, has retreated from that standard into its own black hole of abstractions."); United
States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 392-94 (2d Cir. 1994) (Oakes, J., concurring) (pointing out that
enhancing sentences for acquitted conduct "is, reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland. As the
Queen of Hearts might say, 'Acquittal first, sentence afterwards."'); United States v.
Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 396 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("A just system of
criminal sentencing cannot fail to distinguish between an allegation of conduct resulting in a
conviction and an allegation of conduct resulting in an acquittal."); United States v. Boney, 977
F.2d 624, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("[T]his
conceptual nicety might be lost on a person who... breathes a sigh of relief when the not guilty
verdict is announced without realizing that his term of imprisonment may nevertheless be
'increased' if, at sentencing, the court finds him responsible for the same misconduct. That the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects him from reprosecution on the acquitted count, or that his
acquittal means that his maximum potential sentence will be determined solely on the basis of
the count on which he was convicted is doubtless of little comfort."); United States v. Galloway,
976 F.2d 414, 438 (8th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (Bright, J., dissenting) (remarking about a sentence
that was enhanced from a range of 21-24 months to a range of 63-72 months for uncharged
conduct: "Only in the world of Alice in Wonderland, in which up is down and down is up, and
words lose their real meaning, does such a sentence comply with the Constitution.").
377. United States v. Ibanga, 454 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (E.D. Va. 2006) (explaining that
"[i]n his novel, THE TRIAL Franz Kafka described a totalitarian state in which the judicial
system was used to suppress freedom. One of the techniques used by the state was non-final
'acquittals.' Kafka describes these 'acquittals' as follows: 'That is to say, when [the accused] is
acquitted in this fashion the charge is lifted from [his] shoulders for the time being, but it
continues to hover above [him] and can, as soon as an order comes from on high, be laid upon
[him] again."' (alterations in original)).
378. United States v. England, 966 F.2d 403, 410 n.5 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Boyce F.
Martin, Jr., The CornerstoneHas No Foundation: Relevant Conduct in Sentencing and the
Requirement of Due Process, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 25 (1993) (arguing the
unconstitutionality of the standard of proof for the relevant conduct portion of the Guidelines).
379. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 574 (3d Cir. 2007) (Ambro, J.,
concurring).
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strong belief. Such a conflict between public perception and the Guidelines
decreases the respect the public has for the law.
Sociological and psychological evidence suggests that procedural fairness
or fairness of the process also affects the public's view of the legitimacy of the
law.38 ° Consistent with intuition, research indicates that the public is more
likely to comply with the law when they "buy into" the decisions and rules of
governmental and legal authorities. 38 1 The public is more likely to "buy in" if
the public perceives the legal process and the outcome as fair.3 2 As Professor
Tonry notes, "Legitimacy is increasingly recognized as a key element in how
people relate to government. Whether people have confidence in, support, and
cooperate with public institutions is influenced by the institution's legitimacy in
their eyes. 383 Therefore, the public's cooperation with and confidence in
governmental authority are384closely connected to the public's perception of the
government's legitimacy.
The benefits of legitimacy exceed public compliance; studies show that
society needs the public to be proactive to fight crime. 385 A public that
experiences or observes procedural fairness is one that is motivated to be
proactive.386 As a result, legitimacy is more likely togarner public support and
cooperation in crime prevention and crime fighting. 3 7 While there is much to
gain from legitimacy, concomitantly, there is much to lose if the public views
the criminal justice system and legal process as illegitimate. During a time
380. Tom R. Tyler, ProceduralJustice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283, 286 (2003).
381. Id. See also Paul H. Robinson, A SentencingSystem for the 21st Century?,66 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1987) ("Public perception gives criminal law the moral force that just punishment
theory demands, and provides the threat upon which deterrence is based. Only a sentencing
system that appears to distribute sanctions on a principled basis will inspire the confidence of
the public and of participants in the system.").
382. Tyler, supranote 380, at 292.
383. Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 37, 60 (2005) [hereinafter Tonry, Sentencing Reform].
384. Tyler, supranote 380, at 284-85; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy andthe
Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1787, 1795 (2005) ("For [Max] Weber, legitimacy numbered
among several foundations of political authority. 'Legal legitimacy,' he thought, played the
foremost role in explaining the generally law-abiding character of modem states. In the
Weberian sense, legitimacy signifies an active belief by citizens, whether warranted or not, that
particular claims to authority deserve respect or obedience for reasons not restricted to selfinterest." (footnotes omitted)); Robinson & Darley, supra note 371, at 485 ("When a criminal
law offends the moral intuitions of the governed community, the power of the entire criminal
code to gain compliance from the community is risked. That there exists such unavoidable
sources of injury to the criminal law's moral credibility means that it is that much more
important that the criminal law be formulated to maximize its moral credibility in all those
respects that are within the control of law makers.").
385. Tyler, supra note 380, at 343-44.
386. Id. at 344.
387. See id.at 284.
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when public confidence in the law and legal authorities is declining,388 it is
even more 3important
to recognize the danger of using acquitted conduct in
89
sentencing.
2. Deterrence
Contempt for the law that results from use of acquitted conduct at
sentencing can undermine the law's deterrent effect. Among the factors
articulated in the Guidelines that must be considered in sentencing is "the need
for the sentence imposed . . .to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct." 390 This factor appears to encompass general deterrence and specific
deterrence, both of which would be undermined by using acquitted conduct.
a. General Deterrence
General deterrence seeks to prevent criminality by the general public. A
defendant's prosecution and subsequent punishment serve as an example to the
public of the consequences of engaging in similar behavior. Enhancing
sentences for relevant conduct through the consideration of acquitted conduct
results in an increase in the severity of the punishment. 391 However, it has been
known and proven since the eighteenth century that certainty and celerity of
punishment are more effective deterrents39 2 and increasing severity has no

388. Id, at 291.
389. Not only will the application of proof by a preponderance of the evidence as applied
to acquitted conduct risk causing disrespect for the law through the eyes of the public and the
defendant, but also some commentators have suggested that it may lead to rage in the defendant
and have lasting consequences in prison and upon release:
The danger of anger as it occurs in the criminal is that it has more harmful consequences
than anger in the noncriminal. An anger reaction in the criminal "metastasizes." It begins
with an isolated episode, but spreads and spreads until the criminal has lost all perspective.
Eventually, he decides that everything is worthless.
Amy D. Ronner, Punishment Meted Out for Acquittals: An AntitherapeuticJurisprudence
Atrocity, 41 ARiz. L. REV. 459, 476-77 (1999) (quoting SAMUEL YOCHELSON & STANTON E.
SAMENOw, THE CRIMINAL PERSONALITY 268 (1976)). Perhaps it was this sense of despair that led
Lombard to commit suicide while serving time in the federal prison.
390. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(B) (2003).
391. The Commission recognized that "[u]nder the guidelines, punishment became...
more severe." United States Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of GuidelinesSentencing:
An Assessment of How Well the Federal CriminalJustice System is Achieving the Goals of
Sentencing Reform, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 269, 270 (2005).
392. Tonry, Sentencing Reform, supra note 383, at 52; see also Tyler, supra note 380, at
302-03; Richard S. Frase, PunishmentPurposes,58 STAN.L. REV. 67,72 (2005) ("Research has
found that offenders are more sensitive to the probability of punishment than to its severity."
(citing ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 5, 47 (1999))).
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marginal effect on crime rates.393
In fact, an increase in severity may even increase crime. Professor Frase
notes the following:
General deterrent effects depend on a number of factors: the severity of the
penalty; the swiftness with which it is imposed; the probability of being
caught and punished; the target group's perceptions of the severity, swiftness,
and certainty of punishment; the extent to which members of the target group
suffer from addiction, mental illness, or other conditions which significantly
diminish their capacity to obey the law; and the extent to which these wouldbe offenders face competing pressures or incentives to commit crime. 394
Some of these deterrence factors can interact to cause an unexpected result. A
significant increase in the severity of punishment may decrease the swiftness
and certainty of punishment because defendants facing increased penalties will
more vigorously contest the charges.395
Moreover, because deterrence is dependent upon the public's awareness of,
or at least, perception of the severity of punishment,39 6 enhancing sentences for
acquitted conduct will unlikely result in general deterrence. One researcher
explains the complexity of factors involved for an increase in sentence severity
to affect deterrence:
[Flor a harsher sanction to have an impact, individuals must first believe that
there is a reasonable likelihood that they will be apprehended for the offense
and receive the punishment that is imposed by a court. Second, they must
know that the punishment has changed. It does no good to alter the sanction if
393. For an extensive overview of deterrence studies and literature and critique of findings,
see Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the
Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 146 (2003) (arguing that "sentence severity does not
affect levels of crime"); Tonry, SentencingReform, supranote 383, at 52 ("Imaginable increases
in severity of punishments do not yield significant (ifany) marginal deterrent effects."); Michael
Tonry, PublicProsecutionandHydro-Engineering,75 MINN.L. REv. 971, 982 (1991) ("The
National Research Council Panel on Deterrence and Incapacitation concluded that empirical
evidence does not convincingly demonstrate variable marginal deterrent effects from
manipulation of sanction severity" (citing

DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 7 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds.

1978))).
394. Frase, supra note 392, at 71 ("Thus, increased severity may cause crime rates to

remain the same or even increase.").
395. Id.
396. See Doob & Webster, supra note 393, at 181 ("The reduction of crime through
general deterrence is based on a perceptual theory: the behavior of a person is hypothesized to
be related to the severity of sentences because he or she knows-or perceives-the sanctions to
have a certain level of magnitude."); see also Tonry, Sentencing Reform, supranote 383, at 53
("[T]he idea that increased penalties have sizeable marginal deterrent effects requires heroic and
unrealistic assumptions about 'threat communication,' the process by which would-be offenders
learn that penalty increases have been legislated or are being implemented.").
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potential offenders do not know that it has been modified. Consequences that
are unknown to potential offenders cannot affect their behavior. Third, the
individual must be a person who will consider the penal consequences in
deciding whether to commit the offense. Finally, the potential offender-who
knows about the change in punishment and perceives that there is a
reasonable likelihood of apprehension-must calculate that it is "worth"
offending for the lower397level of punishment but not worth offending for the
increased punishment.
Sentencing based on acquitted conduct as a means to achieve deterrence is
ineffective because it depends upon public awareness, and the shock of the
news that acquitted conduct can affect sentencing would be a reasonable
indicator of the public's lack of awareness. Consequently, members of the
public cannot alter their conduct for fear of the threat of punishment that they
cannot imagine would or could result. Therefore, general deterrence is not an
adequate justification to consider acquitted conduct at sentencing.
b. Specific Deterrence
Similarly, the use of acquitted conduct to enhance sentences does not
achieve specific deterrence. Specific deterrence seeks to prevent further
criminality by the defendant. It is contingent on a rational association in the
defendant's mind between the acquitted conduct and an increased sentence.
Additionally, "improving marginal deterrence would require that such
people-currently inclined to offend-be persuaded not to offend because of the
enhanced penalty. This practice is unlikely if the possible penalty is not part of
their decision-making process. 398

A defendant would not be deterred from future criminal activity because he
or she would not associate the offense of conviction with the enhanced
punishment resulting from the consideration of acquitted conduct. A defendant
who has been acquitted of a particular crime but whose sentence is nevertheless
enhanced based on the acquitted conduct is not likely to reason that he or she
should avoid future crimes of a similar nature because that defendant,
justifiably, will feel that he or she had been vindicated of the acquitted conduct.
As explained above, the defendant's feeling of vindication is not unfounded
because that is the general public perception and likely that of the jury who
issued the acquittal. Even though a court will explain the basis for the
enhancement, the defendant is unlikely to grasp that, as Watts stated,
sentencing based on acquitted conduct is not punishment for the acquitted
conduct, but for the convicted offense. 399 Therefore, the defendant is unlikely to
modify his behavior because the legalistic distinction created by Watts is a
technicality that probably will be lost on the defendant.
397. Doob & Webster, supra note 393, at 190.
398. Id.at 184.
399. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1997) (per curiam).
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Enhanced prison sentences may even cause the opposite effect of specific
deterrence. One study shows a negative correlation between recidivism rates
and sentence severity. 400 This study found that the peak of the pain felt has a
greater effect on the recollection of painful experiences than the length of the
experience. 40 1 Additionally, the study discovered that people tend to overweigh
in their memory the level of pain during the end of the experience. 402 As a
prisoner's experience improves through gaining seniority status and acquisition
of survival skills over time, the prisoner's evaluation of the overall experience
will become more favorable with time, consequently producing a negative
correlation between prison term and specific deterrence. 4 3 Therefore, to the
extent that use of acquitted conduct at sentencing produces more severe
sentences than would result without it, consideration of acquitted conduct is
less effective at achieving specific deterrence.
3. Protecting the Public and Incapacitation
If the relevant conduct provision is grounded in a safety interest, that is, to
safeguard the community from a defendant's bad acts, then consideration of
acquitted conduct at sentencing is unlikely to significantly increase safety. An
incapacitation-based system seeks to protect the public from the possibility of
additional criminality by the defendant during the term of imprisonment. The
premise of an incapacitation model is that increased punishment is "meted out"
for more dangerous criminals-including those who are likely to
recidivate-while those who are unlikely to reoffend receive less severe
sentences. 404 Those who are repeat criminals are considered more dangerous
400. Robinson & Darley, supra note 371, at 462.
401. Id. at 462 (citing Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption,
150 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 18, 33-34 (1994)).
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. As Hofer & Allenbaugh explain,
Under the modified just desert approach, the greatest weight in determining sentences is
given to matching the severity of punishment to the seriousness of the present offense. The
seriousness of an offense depends on both (1) the harm it causes, and (2) the offender's
personal culpability for that harm. Almost all of the provisions in Chapters Two and Three
of the Guidelines Manual,which determine each offender's "offense level," can be seen to
measure harm and, to a lesser extent, culpability.
The next important factor in a modified just desert system is the need to incapacitate for
longer periods the more dangerous offenders, as measured by their risk of recidivism. To
minimize the tension between the goals ofjust desert and incapacitation, the Commission
chose to measure recidivism risk based only on an offender's criminal history, on the
theory that past offenses also increase an offender's culpability. The number of criminal
convictions and the length of sentences that were imposed are translated into a "criminal
history score." Together, the offense level and criminal history score determine the
sentencing options available for each offender and the range of sentence lengths
recommended for those who are imprisoned.
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than a one-time offender. 40 5 As applied, current sentencing policies are
incapacitating the wrong people. 40 6 The serious sentences imposed upon serious
recidivists tend to incapacitate older offenders whose criminal activities will
soon wane. 40 7 Also, as soon as some offenders are incapacitated, such as those
committing drug or gang-related 4crimes,
they are quickly replaced by others
°8
who are eager to fill the vacancy.
Also, predicting recidivism is quite difficult. An incapacitation system
depends on accurate predictions of recidivism, but as studies show, judges are
not the best predictors of recidivism.40 9 One study found that only one out of
the three or four persons predicted to reoffend actually recidivate.4 0 Another
found that 47% of those predicted to recidivate did not reoffend, and 28% of
those who did in fact recidivate were not persons predicted to reoffend. 411
The false positives and false negatives in these studies present two
problems. First, the false negatives are indicative of the system's failure to
protect the public from those who do actually reoffend but were not
incapacitated for a term that reflected this increased level of dangerousness.
Second, the false positives are indicative of an inefficient system because
defendants who were wrongly predicted to reoffend will have received longer
sentences based on that prediction, and thereby, will unnecessarily crowd the
prisons. Thus, the incapacitation policies behind use of acquitted conduct at
sentencing are neither effective at crime prevention nor economical.4 12
4. Unwarranted Disparities and Unwarranted Similarities
Consideration of acquitted conduct does not ameliorate problems of
unwarranted disparities and in fact, risks causing unwarranted similarities,
which is as egregious as the former. Excluding acquitted conduct at sentencing
will not lead to unwarranted disparities because the relevant conduct provisions
Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 368, at 24.
405. Id.
406. Tonry, Sentencing Reform, supra note 383, at 54.
407. See id
408. See id.; see also Frank 0. Bowman 1II, The Quality ofMercy Must Be Restrained, and
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 679,
741-42 (1996) (explaining that as long as there is a demand for drugs, incapacitating drug
dealers only changes the cost-benefit analysis of replacement dealers taking their place).
409. See Reitz, supra note 11, at 555 ("Research shows that, despite our faith that we can
spot those offenders most likely to recidivate, individualized predictions of future
dangerousness are little better than a game of chance. There is no doubt that some incapacitation
occurs as a result of incarceration and other sanctions, but it does not occur because sentencing
courts have made accurate forecasts of individual defendants' future criminality.").
410. See Tonry, Sentencing Reform, supra note 383, at 54.
411. Robinson & Darley, supra note 371, at 465.
412. Tonry, Sentencing Reform, supra note 383, at 54 ("From a cost-benefit perspective,
locking up all those people is not an obviously good investment of public resources.");
Robinson & Darley, supra note 371, at 466.
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were intended to capture convicted conduct, not acquitted conduct. 4 13 Rather,
consideration of acquitted conduct leads to unwarranted similarities by treating
acquitted conduct as if a conviction had been obtained.
Courts justify consideration of acquitted conduct because they believe that
a refusal to include acquitted conduct in sentencing determinations will cause
unwarranted disparity in contravention of the relevant conduct provisions.
Some judges are concerned that if they exclude acquitted conduct from
sentencing considerations, it will result in disparate treatment among
defendants who are equally culpable. These judges reason that if they find
(usually using a preponderance of the evidence standard) that a defendant
committed the acquitted conduct, then this defendant's culpability is similar to
the culpability of defendants who have been convicted of the same crime
(beyond a reasonable doubt), and thus, their sentences should be similar
pursuant to the relevant conduct provisions.
However, a disparity based on nonconviction offenses is not
unwarranted-it is justifiable to treat a defendant acquitted of an offense
differently than one who had been convicted. According to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, "Fair sentencing is individualized sentencing. ' '4 14 The
Commission defines "unwarranted disparity" as "different treatment of
individual offenders who are similar in relevant ways, or similar treatment of
individual offenders who differ in characteristics that are relevant to the
purposes of sentencing. ' 415 Even if a court were to find at sentencing that a
defendant committed the acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence,
this defendant is not similarly situated as another defendant who has actually
been convicted of that offense. The convicted defendant has had the benefit of
413.

See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000).

414.

U. S. SENT'G COMM'N, FIFrEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES 113 (2004), available at

http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year studyfull.pdf.
415. Id. In its study of the Guidelines, the Commission conceded that disparity in sentences
remains among regions and races, and between genders. Not only does regional disparity exist,
but disparity "may have increased for some types of cases." Id. at 99. The Commission also
reported a disparity in sentences for African-American offenders versus offenders from other
groups.
Most notably, while the gap in average sentences between White and minority offenders
was relatively small in the preguidelines era, the gap between African-Americans and other
groups began to widen at the time of guidelines implementation, which was also the period
during which large groups of offenders became subject to mandatory minimum drug
sentences. The gap was greatest in the mid-1990s and has narrowed only slightly since
then.
Id. at xiv. The gender disparity is even greater than the racial or ethnic disparity. As shown by
the Commission's study,
Like the gap between Black offenders and other groups, the gap in average prison terms
between male and female offenders has widened in the guidelines era .... Gender effects
are found in both drug and non-drug offenses and greatly exceed the race and ethnic effects
discussed above. The typical male drug offender has twice the odds of going to prison as a
similar female offender.
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the most rigorous standard of proof and procedural protections available at trial.
The evidence supporting a determination of "culpability" at sentencing pales in
comparison to that at trial, where the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard,
rules of evidence, and confrontation rights apply.
Moreover, as Congress stressed, "[t]he key word in discussing unwarranted
sentence disparities is 'unwarranted.'''4 6 Statutory language and legislative
history support an understanding that Congress was concerned about disparity
among convicted offenses, not just any offense. 4" 7
First, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)
supports the argument that the purpose of relevant conduct is to reduce
unwarranted disparity among defendants who have been convicted of the same
offense. Section 3553(a)(6) requires judges to "impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greaterthan necessary,... to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct.' '4 18 Also, 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b)(1)(B) sheds light onto the disparity issue.
It states:
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal
justice system that(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing...
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of

similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences when warranted by
mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the
establishment of general sentencing practices .... 419
Both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) make clear that
disparity caused by acquitted conduct was not a concern.
416. Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, supra note 41, at 424 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, at
161 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3344).
417. For excellent discussions about disparity, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The
Normative and Empirical Failureof The Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005)
(concluding that disparity is not only empirical, but also normative); Marc L. Miller, Sentencing
Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271 (2005) [hereinafter Miller, Sentencing Equality
Pathology] (discussing concerns about uniformity in sentencing); O'Hear, supra note 37
(arguing that the statutory language, legislative history, and principles underlying Booker and
Blakely support a disparity analysis based on convicted conduct); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Assessing the FederalSentencingProcess: The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity,29 AM.
CRim. L. REv. 833 (1992) (criticizing the excessive focus on disparity and evaluating the claims
of Judge Heaney).
418. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2003) (emphasis added).
419. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2003) (emphasis added); see also Miller, Sentencing
Equality Pathology,supranote 417, at 274; O'Hear, supra note 37, at 633.
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Second, the Senate and House Judiciary Committees expressed an interest
in reducing disparity resulting from convicted offenses. The Senate Judiciary
Committee urged reforms after the following acknowledgment:
[E]very day [flederal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range of
sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes,
committed under similar circumstances. One offender may receive a sentence
of probation, while another-convictedof the very same crime and possessing
a comparable criminal history-may be sentenced to a lengthy term of
imprisonment.420
The House Judiciary Committee was similarly concerned with disparity. The
focus, as apparent from the House Judiciary Committee report, was on avoiding
disparity between convicted offenses: "[S]imilar offenders convicted of similar
offenses committed under similar circumstances should receive similar
sentences.''421 Although the statutory texts use the term "found guilty" and the
legislative reports of the House and Senate use the term "convicted," the terms
are synonymous and are evidence that consideration of relevant conduct at
sentencing was not intended to encompass acquitted conduct.
Logic buttresses this conclusion because by subsuming acquitted conduct
under relevant conduct, a more flagrant form of disparity occurs-use of
acquitted conduct to impose the same sentence as if a conviction had been
obtained. It is fundamentally unfair that a defendant who has been acquitted by
ajury receives the same sentence as another defendant who has been convicted
of that offense. Indeed, the Supreme Court has implicitly approved
consideration of avoiding unwarranted similarities (treating differently situated
defendants alike), as well as avoiding unwarranted disparities (treating similarly
situated defendants differently) in sentencing.42 2 The Court in Gall recognized
that the District Judge considered the need to avoid unwarranted disparities,
but also considered the need to avoid unwarranted similaritiesamong other
co-conspirators who were not similarly situated. The District Judge regarded
Gall's voluntary withdrawal as a reasonable basis for giving him a less severe
sentence than the three codefendants .... who neither withdrew from the
conspiracy nor rehabilitated themselves as Gall had done.423
The Court's finding that the district court's below-advisory-Guideline variance
was reasonable, despite the defendant's admission to the criminal activity,
paves the way forjudges to reject consideration of acquitted conduct because it
would cause unwarranted similarities between a defendant convicted by ajury
420. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology,supra note 417, at 273-74 (quoting S. REP.
No. 98-225, at 38 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3183, 3221-29) (emphasis added).
421. O'Hear, supra note 37, at 641 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 2 (1984))
(emphasis removed and added).
422. Kalar & Sands, supra note 26, at 27.
423. Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 600 (2007).
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and one vindicated by a jury.
In sum, § 3553(a) factors provide judges with a vehicle to restore the
venerable significance of acquittals and of juries. Once again, acquittals may
signify the community's declaration of innocence, whether legal or actual.
CONCLUSION

Judges "have assailed the Guidelines" for their complexity and rigidity and
for ignoring individual defendant characteristics.424 Some judges have criticized
the Guidelines for reducing their role to "rubber-stamp bureaucrats" and
"judicial accountants. ' '425 Now, after Booker has relegated the Guidelines as
advisory, some judges still presume that the sentence should fall within the
Guideline range 26 and display a reluctance to assert independence from the
Guidelines. In 2003, before Blakely and Booker, 92.5% of the defendants were
sentenced within or above Guideline range; 7.5% of the sentences were below
Guideline range.427 In the year of Booker, 87% of the sentences were within or
above advisory Guideline range; 13% of the sentences were below advisory
Guideline range. 428 Post-Gall and Kimbrough, judges sentenced within or
above advisory Guidelines in 86.6% of the sentences; 13.4% of the sentences
were below advisory Guideline range. 429 Although the below Guideline
sentences increased, these figures are not as dramatic as expected.
In fact, these figures are consistent with Judge Nancy Gertner's
observations:
[Jjudicial behavior that existed before Booker continue[s]. At a time when
sentencing discretion [has been] apparently restored, court after court insist[s]
424. Douglas A. Berman, DistinguishingOffense Conduct and Offender Characteristicsin
Modem Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REv. 277, 284 (2005).
425. Id.at 284-85; see also Frank S. Gilbert, A ProbationOfficer's Perception of the
Allocation of Discretion, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 109, 109 (1991) ("A well-known and highly
respected jurist recently observed that his sentencing role has been relegated to that of a 'notary
public."').
426. See Judge Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and
Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 525, 537 (2007) [hereinafter Judge Gertner, American
Judges and Sentencing].
427. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICs § 2 fig.G
(10th ed. 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/fig-g-pre.pdf. Throughout
this Article, the statistics provided were the result of combining the amount of within and above
range sentences, substantial assistance departures, and government sponsored departures.
428. Id. at § 3 fig.G, availableat http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/fig-g-post.pdf. The
Commission collected data for the fiscal year. Id.This data represents cases from January 12,
2005 through September 30, 2005. Id.
429. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, PRELIMINARY POST-KMBROUGH/GALL DATA REPORT tbl.1
(2008), availableat http://www.ussc.gov/USSC Kimbrough_CralReportMay_08_Final.pdf.
The post-Kimbrough/Gall data is based on the collection of cases in which defendants were
sentenced on or after December 10, 2007. Id.at tbl. 1 n. 1.
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that the advisory Guidelines [are] entitled to considerable, even presumptive,
weight, effectively trumping any standards that common law judges might
create in their stead. Notwithstanding a rich history ofjudicial sentencing predating the Guidelines, many federal judges ... believe that they [are] not
competent to sentence at all, absent explicit rules externally promulgated by
Congress or the Commission. These entities, they conclude[], [have] far
greater expertise than judges .... 43 0
But judges do have the expertise and competence to sentence. Indeed, as
the Eighth Circuit has concluded "Control over this sentencing practice rests in
the hands of the district judge.'"431 Ifjudges embrace their independence, they
can restore the significance of juries and acquittals by rejecting the use of
acquitted conduct at sentencing.

430. Judge Gertner, American Judges and Sentencing, supra note 426, at 525; see also
United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 333 n.76 (D. Mass. 2006) ("Judges once felt
empowered just by virtue of their robes to do justice in sentencing; now they seem to feel
incompetent without the Sentencing Manual." (quoting Eric Citron, Sentencing Review:
Judgment, Justice, and the Judiciary, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 150, 153 (2006),
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/citron.htral)).
431. United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 427 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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